

Botnet Takedowns - Our GameOver Zeus Experience

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Contents

What the average LE officer knows of botnets

Cryptolocker

Gameover ZeuS

How both were broken

Learning the lessons of cooperation

Looking to the future













Conspiracy to Participate in Racketeering Activity; Bank Fraud; Conspiracy to Violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Conspiracy to Violate the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act; Aggravated Identity Theft; Conspiracy; Computer Fraud; Wire Fraud; Money Laundering; Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud

EVGENIY MIKHAILOVICH BOGACHEV



Aliases: Yevgeniy Bogachev, Evgeniy Mikhaylovich Bogachev, "lucky12345", "slavik", "Pollingsoon" DESCRIPTION

Date(s) of Birth Used:	October 28, 1983								
Height:	Approximately 5'9"	Hair:	Brown (usually shaves his head)						
Weight:	Approximately 180 pounds	Eyes:	Brown						
NCIC:	W890989955	Sex:	Male						
Occupation:	Bogachev works in the Information Technology field.	Race:	White						
Remarks:	Bogachev was last known to reside in Anapa, Russia. He is known to enjoy boating and may travel locations along the Black Sea in his boat. He also owns property in Krasnodar, Russia.								

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+ https://goz.shadowserver.org/stats/

Current Day: 2014-11-05 00:00:00 UTC



Unique Gameover Zeus IPs Per Day Unique Infected IPs



Gameover Zeus (DGA) By Region

Gameover Zeus (Proxy) By Region

Gameover Zeus (Peer) By Region

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		Average					Average					Average			
Region Subregion	Current Total	from prior 7		Region	Subregion	Current Total	prior 7	30 Day Trend	Region	Subregion	Current Total	from prior 7	30 Day Trend		
		days					days					days			
Africa	10232	7010		Africa		9052	8258		Africa		1700	1560			
Eastern Africa	1012	622			Eastern	876	797		-	Eastern	374	298			
Middle Africa	188	153			Africa Middle	134	139		<u> </u>	Africa Middle	64	58			
Northern Africa	4960	3749			Africa Northern	4428	4298		-	Africa Northern	434	438			
Southern Africa	2978	1831			Africa Southern	2702	2291		-	Africa Southern	620	587			
Western Africa	1094	654			Africa Western	912	732		-	Africa Western	208	178			
Americas	27016	19488		1	Africa	312	152			Africa	200	170			
Caribbean	832	566		Americ	as	22648	20926		Americ	as	9658	9156			
Central America	3704	2575		1	Caribbean	696	596		1	Caribbean	282	264			



How To Explain This?







PROTECT YOUR COMPUTER Get current anti-virus software and run it now Update your software Back up everything now Don't open emails from strangers Do some password hygiene











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	Home > Protect yourself against new malware threat on Windows computers Image: Section 2 Image: Section 2 Image: Section 2									
	The single copy of the private key, which will allow you to decrypt the files, located on a secret server on the Internet; the server will destroy the key after a time specified in this window. After that, nobody and never will be able to restore files. Protect yourself against new malware threat on Windows computers This page has been created to help you protect your computer, your finances,									
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Public Response

- ³/₃ reduction in UK IP addresses hitting sinkhole
- Massive uptake of AV tools





Sounds Simple...



Infection Basics



Cutwail botnet aka Pushdo

Spams Upatre downloader

Installs Gameover ZeuS malware

optionally loads Cryptolocker ransomware



Visible Threat: Cryptolocker





Cryptolocker DGA

Proxy Loyer(s)

"Taus88" (as per Wikipedia)

- 1,000 *possible* domains generated **daily**
- Across seven TLD's (.com, .netru)
- Predictable!



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Multiple Jurisdictions...

1st April 2014

avyrwkqfybrxsy.com natuwpmsqjecsm.net aksgduuoktdyac.biz nonjdaqcccpdqk.ru cfdkwfiapjrvsd.org pjxnwkenhreasx.co.uk cgwaulfcrjrovc.info



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Multiple Jurisdictions...

1st April 2014

avyrwkqfybrxsy.com natuwpmsqjecsm.net aksgduuoktdyac.biz nonjdaqcccpdqk.ru cfdkwfiapjrvsd.org pjxnwkenhreasx.co.uk cgwaulfcrjrovc.info

- = Verisign (USA)
- = Verisign (USA)
- = Neustar (USA)
- = ccTLD.ru (Russia)
- = Public Interest Registry (USA)
- = Nominet (UK)
- = Afilias (USA)



... Different Approaches

.com, **.net**, **.org**, **.biz** & **.info** - US Court orders to compel 4 Registries to sinkhole

.co.uk - Nominet flagged for manual review

.ru - Registry blocked DGA registrations*

+ 'Belt and Braces' - court orders compelled 20 US ISPs to block DGA domains

++ Some 3rd party DNS providers took measures to block



Silent Threat: Gameover ZeuS



- Classic banking / credential-stealing trojan
- P2P communications hinder detection
- Access to live user sessions via webinjects
- Responsible for more than \$100m losses
 - "3D" money laundering



Gameover ZeuS DGA

- 1,000 *possible* domains generated **weekly**
- Across **six** TLD's (.com, .netru) Dealt with as per Cryptolocker DGA

pkfhpbstogaschewbiusxoxlrk.net dynjxvcvopzgyrhfmud.org ppojgajhdeinqoocecyf.info eqmzlrhekfxoqcjzdqdlmrorgymr.biz tsbuciycqsvoxivuocmwhbcy.ru rwclzjzjvcqxbiswnjsklrrg.com

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Gameover ZeuS P2P



Highly Resilient Peer-to-Peer Botnets Are Here: An Analysis of Gameover Zeus

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Coordinated Effort



- 1. Industry-led replay attack on p2p mechanism
- 2. Court-ordered DGA sinkholing by Registries
- 3. Court-ordered DGA blocking at US ISP's
- 4. LE seized servers in 11 countries
- 5. Supernodes removed from DHCP pool
- 6. NCA support in sinkholing last domains



Ops Rooms

EC3 - Europol early shift - NCFTA/FBI - late shift

Single operation - 11 nations intelligence sharing in real time

Industry experts present / on hand in Ops Room

- Shadowserver
- Dell Secureworks
- Crowdstrike
- Cisco



Learning

- Understanding the criminal business model
- Mapping infrastructure
- Intelligence shared whilst actionable in trustgroups
- Mistakes happened reacted quickly & fairly
- Use of media attention to upskill users
- Use of CERTs & Industry to aid public remediation
- Focus on what we each do best then shared and coordinated!



Future

- What happens when court orders expire?
- Development of Registrar of Last-Resort?
- Increase in cooperation & trust between LE - EC3/J-CAT - Industry - Experts



Questions?

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