Hunting for MageCart


BY MAX 'LIBRA' KERSTEN

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Who am 1?

- Max 'Libra' Kersten (@LibraAnalysis)
- Graduated my bachelor cum laude in January 2019
- Worked as an Android malware analyst for <u>ThreatFabric</u>
- I write <u>blogs</u> about reverse engineering
 - Including my own <u>Binary Analysis Course</u>
- Custom tools are open-sourced on my <u>Github</u>
 - AndroidProjectCreator is such a project
- Public speaker and trainer
 - Gave a workshop at <u>Botconf2019</u> about static Android malware analysis
 - Spoke at the <u>Confidence-Conference 2020</u> about AndroidProjectCreator



Who am 1?

- Employed at <u>ABN AMRO</u>'s Global Cyber Intelligence Center
- Focus on outside threats to provide timely and actionable intelligence to internal departments
- Research focused projects, with the aim to also give something back to the community



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What is MageCart?

- A collective term for credit card stealers
 - The name is based on the Magento eCommerce platform
 - MageCart has become a "household term"
 - Targets a variety of Magento versions, often outdated ones
 - o Cardbleed, discovered by SanSec, infected 3% of the EOL Magento 1 sites
- It consists of multiple skimmer script "versions"
- The skimmers are not tied to only a single group
 - This talk dives into MageCart Group 12 (as identified by RiskIQ)



Source: AskariBlue.com

Skimmers are hard to spot, as their activity does not take anything "away"

Different skimmers

- Different skimmers
 - Radix Skimmer
 - Ant and Cockroach Skimmer
 - o "C"
- Obfuscation made identification harder
 - Minimised code
 - ObfuscatorIO



Source: AskariBlue.com

- Tackled this issue by creating a private scanner and a private deobfuscator
 - Will remain private due to the code quality (or rather, lack thereof)

```
var newDiv = document["createElement"]("div"); //div creation
//loading all variables
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=[I80,f0h,No5,ugr,vfS,e3X]["join"](" ");
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"]([agF,g2m,KRb,f1D,Le9,mL5,Gbq,XYt]["join"](",")));
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=[GCI,QV5,mvk,mku,F6h]["join"](".");
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+Y58+w40+DHh+tq4+HYp+DtA;
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+srT+Zhl+ID6+TJ7;
newDiv["appendChild"](document["createTextNode"](ss8+v2R+sxr+aDI));
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"]([sSO,Rx1,it8,dhN,dlt,ah0]["join"](".")));
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+qa6+Yvi+ykx+cpx+FoE+Sp6;
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=tge+TsX+dX +ASc+Lt0;
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=[yTN,mEE,POT,gB4,eQK,DGo,Xp5]["join"](" ");
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=uJi+pgA+noL+177+ktr;
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"] (oLu+Yhp+B4g+DJT+D5Y));
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=LuG+e3f+rHc+yFj+cVL+LLF+x5y;
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+[NkN,nC0,HVt,Eyn,HbU,yBF,I7C]["join"](".");
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"] (M m+BqN+OE9+pDj+tvc));
newDiv["innerHTML"]+=pIv+we9+f7Z+Fbp+Sdp;
newDiv["appendChild"](document["createTextNode"](zvS+vNn+MJH+IWv+e5M));
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+[gVi,Hpc,myt,oGj,cPT,AQY]["join"](".");
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"] (zZu+KCs+gcA+wU1+N7M+xJb));
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+F1A+PqT+wjD+Wv2+ApR+z9E;
newDiv["innerHTML"]=newDiv["innerHTML"]+SIT+HcG+kKz+elu;
newDiv["appendChild"] (document["createTextNode"] (vb3+JqW+cJC));
newDiv=newDiv["innerHTML"];
newDiv=newDiv["replace"](/[\s+\.\,]/q,"");
var newFunction="73b372o2s2a2y1x2o2g2i323e251w0y2j141g1cle1k1d1j1".constructor; //Newly made function type, used to launch final code
var ih3={}::
var unobfuscatedSkimmer = ""; //Unobfuscated skimmer is loaded here
var radix = 36; //Set the radix for the integer conversion
for (var i = 0; i < newDiv["length"]; i += 2) {
    unobfuscatedSkimmer += String["fromCharCode"](parseInt(newDiv["substr"](i, 2), radix)) //
1;
ih3["toString"]=newFunction["constructor"](unobfuscatedSkimmer); //newDiv equals skimmer at this point, which is then invoked via the constructor
unobfuscatedSkimmer=ih3+"92k14212f2i2e. 21lb2v180y0y15150w0x1p1p0w3239303"; //Remove unobfuscatedSkimmer from memory by overwriting it
newDiv["innerHTML"]="kl01oli1, d252k3clklhlqlv2j0y2j0y302t322v382"; //Remove the new div from memory
```

Tracking campaigns


- "Never break the chain"-Fleetwood Mac
- Keeping track of the actor's next steps is key
 - Linking scripts and/or domains to other domains will form connections
 - The connections will form a web
- Compare it to tracking someone in a crowd
 - A few seconds are enough for someone to get away



Source: courtesy of <u>Tripadvisor</u>, posted by PriyanshuB

Tracking campaigns

Malicious JavaScript Site A



Tracking campaigns

20 January: <u>ticket</u> resellers contain a MageCart infection

17 February: following up on RiskIQ's research

6 May:

Backtracking MageCart 12












27 January:

pivoting from the exfiltration domain


24 February:

Closing in on MageCart 12


Analysis results



Analysis results



Economic implications



Indirect collaboration

- Used the first public publisher as a source, disregarding private datasets
 - Sources listed in no particular order, nor do I have any affiliation with them
- Sources
 - SanSec (Willem especially)
 - RiskIQ (especially Jordan "<u>TracerSpiff</u>" Herman and <u>Yonathan Klijnsma</u>)
 - Jérôme Segura
 - Affable Kraut
 - Group-IB
 - TrustWave
 - Jacob Pimental
 - Mikhail Kasimov
 - o Jake
 - URLScan
- An additional thank you to <u>Ophir Harpaz</u> for reviewing my submission

Questions?

