
DeStroid - Fighting String Encryption in Android Malware

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String Encryption

Introduction

- Android is an attractive target for attackers (especially malware developers)
 - Security analyst are interested in the functionalities and goals of Android malware
 - Malware developers are hiding their malicious behavior with different obfuscation techniques



<http://pctechmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/threat android.jpg>

String Encryption

Introduction


Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

PHA Family Highlights: Triada

June 6, 2019

Posted by Lukasz Siewierski, Android Security & Privacy Team



String Encryption

Introduction

Wirtschaft > Digitec > Malware befällt 25 Millionen Android-Smartphones

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ANDROID-GERÄTE BETROFFEN

Malware befällt 25 Millionen Mobiltelefone

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Forbes

Billionaires

Innovation

Leadership

Money

Business

Small Business

EDITOR'S PICK | 278,103 views | Nov 2, 2019, 07:59am

Android Security Threat As 'Unremovable' Malware Infects 45,000 Phones So Far


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
PDF E-Paper



ANDROID-GERÄTE BETROFFEN

Malware befällt 25 Millionen Mobiltelefone

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Android banking botnet targets thousands

By Anthony Spadafora October 03, 2019 Computing

Researchers discover new botnet that has already infected over 800,000 Android devices



EDITOR'S PICK | 278,103 views | Nov 1

Android Security Threat As 'Unremovable' Malware Infects 45,000 Phones So Far

String Encryption

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Wirtschaft › Digitec › Malware befällt 25 Millionen Android-Smart

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Fran

ANDROID-GERÄTE BETROFFEN

Malware befällt Mobiltelefone

VON BASTIAN BENRATH - AKTUALISIEI



Forbes

Warnung des BSI

Schadsoftware auf Tablets und Smartphones

Stand: 26.02.2019 13:40 Uhr



Schadsoftware auf neu gekauften Geräten - davor warnt das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. Tausende Nutzer werden mutmaßlich von vorinstallierten Programmen ausgespäht.

Von Philipp Wundersee, WDR

"Der gesunde Menschenverstand ist durch nichts zu ersetzen", sagt Jörg Schwenk vom Lehrstuhl für Netz- und Datensicherheit der Universität Bochum. "Wenn das Gerät sehr günstig ist, wird der Hersteller ein verstecktes Geschäftsmodell eingepflegt haben. Da sollte man skeptisch sein."

Fachleute des Bundesamts für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik hatten im Internet bei Amazon drei Billigeräte bestellt und getestet. Es geht um das Tablet Eagle 804 von Krüger&Matz, das Smartphone S8 Pro von Ulefone und das Smartphone A10 von Blackview. Das Tablet fanden sie sofort ein Schadprogramm. Bei den zwei chinesischen Smartphones waren ältere Betriebssysteme betroffen, die man zur Nutzung des Handys über das Update herunterladen muss.

"Wenn der Hersteller nicht zuverlässig ist, kann er beliebige Software auf sein Gerät laden. Beim Kauf haben die Kunden erst einmal keinen Verdacht", sagt Schwenk. "Man kann nicht sicher sein, ob ein Handy oder Tablet sei leider manchmal die Privatsphäre. Nicht immer würde man die Schadsoftware erkennen."



king botnet targets thousands

über 03, 2019 Computing

ver new botnet that has already infected over devices



SOPHOS

PRODUCTS ▾ SOLUTIONS

Overview Investo

Sophos News

The price of a cheap mobile phone may include your privacy

SophosLabs · SophosLabs Uncut · Android · Android malware · Pre-installed malware · Sophos Mobile · Supply chain

Inexpensive mobile phones may be subject to "supply chain compromise," with Trojaned third party apps. We look at a phone that shipped with factory-installed malware

String Encryption

Motivation

What we want:

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put("imei", C0012m.m68c(context));  
        jsonObject.put("imsi", C0012m.m71d(context));  
        jsonObject.put("uuid", C0012m.m49a());  
        jsonObject.put("net", C0005f.m37b(context));  
        jsonObject.put("channel", TextUtils.isEmpty(C0012m.m61b())? "chann" : C0012m.m61b());  
        jsonObject.put("existPackages", C0012m.m76f(context));  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;  
}
```

Decompiled excerpt of a sample of the backdoor *Android.OS.Triada2016* malware

String Encryption

Motivation

What we get:

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f17I), C0012m.m68c(context));  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f18J), C0012m.m71d(context));  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f20L), C0012m.m49a());  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f21M), C0005f.m37b(context));  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f19K), TextUtils.isEmpty(C0012m.m61b()) ? "channn" ...  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f22N), C0012m.m76f(context));  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;  
}
```

Decompiled excerpt of a sample of the backdoor *Android.OS.Triada2016* malware

String Encryption

Motivation

What we get:

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject json0bject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        json0bject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f1774);
```



String Encryption


Motivation

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f17I), ...);  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f18J), ...);  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f20L), ...);  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f21M), ...);  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f19K), ...);  
        jsonObject.put(C0012m.m56a(C001b.f22N), ...);  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;  
}
```

String Encryption

Motivation

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f17I)", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f18J)", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f20L)", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f21M)", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f19K)", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f22N)", ...);  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;  
}
```



```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put("imei", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("imsi", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("uuid", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("net", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("channel", ...);  
        jsonObject.put("existPackages", ...);  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
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String Encryption

Motivation

```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
    try {  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f17I),...;  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f18J),...;  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f20L),...);  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f21M), ...;  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f19K), ...;  
        jsonObject.put("C0012m.m56a(C001b.f22N), ...;  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;  
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```
public static JSONObject m64b(Context context) {  
    JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();  
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        jsonObject.put("imei", ...;  
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        jsonObject.put("uuid", ...;  
        jsonObject.put("net", ...;  
        Object.put("channel", ...;  
        Object.put("existPackages", ...;  
    } catch (Exception e) {}  
    return jsonObject;
```



String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

- How?



String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

- How?
 - ground truth?



String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

- How?
 - ground truth?



String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

- How?
 - analyze every sample by hand




String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

■ How?

- analyze every sample by hand



String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

- How?
 - implement a tool to automatically decrypt the major String Encryption types




String Encryption

Roadmap to DeStroid

■ How?

- implement a tool to automatically decrypt the major String Encryption types



String Encryption

Dataset

- Malpedia APK dataset
 - Maintained and updated with new families as they occur
 - **96** Android malware families (as of October 2019)
 - **50/96** Android malware families using String Encryption

The screenshot shows the Malpedia dataset interface. At the top, there's a search bar with the text 'apk'. Below it, a list of malware families is displayed, each with a small Android icon and the family name. The families listed are: AdultSwine, AhMyth, AndroRAT, Anubis (with a note 'aka. BankBot, android.bankbot, android.bankspy'), AnubisSpy, and Asacub.

Malware Family	Notes
AdultSwine	
AhMyth	
AndroRAT	
Anubis	aka. BankBot, android.bankbot, android.bankspy
AnubisSpy	
Asacub	



<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/>


Want Access?

Talk to Daniel Plohmann here at



String Encryption


Taxonomy of String Encryption Techniques




String Encryption

Taxonomy of String Encryption Techniques


String Repository



Pass String




Native Library




String Encryption

Taxonomy of String Encryption Techniques


String Repository



Pass String



Native Library



String Encryption


String Repository: <clinit>

1
field public static x:[B
.field public static y:[B
.field public static z:[B

```
# direct methods
.method static constructor <clinit>()V
    .locals 8
...
new-array v0, v0, [B
...
const/4 v1, 0x5
const/16 v2, 0x22
aput-byte v2, v0, v1
sput-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption

String Repository: <clinit>


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 new-array v0, v0, [B

 ...
 const/4 v1, 0x5
 const/16 v2, 0x22
 aput-byte v2, v0, v1
 sput-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption


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```
# direct methods
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    .locals 8
...
new-array v0, v0, [B
...
const/4 v1, 0x5
const/16 v2, 0x22
aput-byte v2, v0, v1
sput-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption

String Repository: <clinit>

2


```
sget-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B
```

```
invoke-static {v0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/m;->a([B)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
move-result-object v0
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption

String Repository: <clinit>

2


```
sget-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B
```

```
invoke-static {v0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/m;->a([B)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
move-result-object v0
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption


String Repository: <clinit>

2

```
sget-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B  
invoke-static {v0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/m;->a([B)Ljava/lang/String;  
move-result-object v0  
  
.method public static a([B)Ljava/lang/String;  
...  
invoke-virtual {v0, p0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/j;->a([B)[B
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption

String Repository: <clinit>

2

```
sget-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B
```

```
invoke-static {v0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/m;->a([B)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
move-result-object v0
```

```
.method public static a([B)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
..
```

```
invoke-virtual {v0, p0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/j;->a([B)[B
```

the actual decryption routine


```
aget-byte v5, v5, v6
```

```
xor-int/2addr v4, v5
```

```
...
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware

String Repository



String Encryption

String Repository: <clinit>


2

the used decryption algorithm differs between families and sometimes even between different versions of a family

const-string/jumbo v1, "DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding"

```
invoke-static {v1}, Ljavax/crypto/Cipher;->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljavax/crypto/Cipher;  
...
```

String Repository



String Encryption


String Repository: <clinit>

3

```
sget-object v0, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/b;->y:[B  
invoke-static {v0}, Lcom/android/system/conect/test/m;->a([B)Ljava/lang/String;  
  
move-result-object v0  
  
# const-string v0, "android.intent.action.SCREEN_OFF"
```

Android.OS.Triada2016 malware


String Repository




String Encryption

Taxonomy of String Encryption Techniques


String Repository



Pass String



Native Library



String Encryption

Pass String: Encrypted String


1

```
const-string v1, "709L5MxPf92ieYmDMGGpZIYAa0k3q/kQCI1amkd4ulrebFJy0bLs8Py0kJCdmu4L4U99b5FJ1d8="
```

```
invoke-static {v1}, Lcom/android/support/utils/g;->b(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
move-result-object v1
```

Pass String



Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Prizmes.a malware

String Encryption

Pass String: Encrypted String


2

```
const-string v1, "709L5MxPf92ieYmDMGGpZIYAa0k3q/kQCI1amkd4ulrebFJy0bLs8Py0kJCdmu4L4U99b5FJ1d8="
```

```
invoke-static {v1}, Lcom/android/support/utils/g;->b(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
move-result-object v1
```

Pass String



Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Prizmes.a malware

String Encryption

Pass String: Encrypted String

3


```
const-string v1, "709L5MxPf92ieYmDMGGpZIYAa0k3q/kQCI1amkd4ulrebFJy0bLs8Py0kJCdmu4L4U99b5FJ1d8="

invoke-static {v1}, Lcom/android/support/utils/g;->b(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;

move-result-object v1

#const-string v1, "http://play.xhxt2016.com/logcollect/log-information"
```

Pass String




Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Prizmes.a malware


String Encryption

Taxonomy of String Encryption Techniques


String Repository



Pass String



Native Library



String Encryption


Native Library: Native to Bytecode

1

```
MOVS    R0, #0xA6  
BX      LR  
; End of function 0x11105561640
```

flexispy malware

Native Library



String Encryption


Native Library: Native to Bytecode

2

```
STRB.W    R0, [SP, #0x68+var_59]  
BL        0x11105561640  
ADDS     R0, #0x19  
  
STRB.W    R0, [SP, #0x68+var_58]  
BL        0x11163188672  
ADDS     R0, #0x19
```

flexispy malware

Native Library



String Encryption


Native Library: Native to Bytecode

3

```
.class public Lk/v/F;  
...  
# virtual methods  
.method public native fpu()[B  
.end method
```

flexispy malware

Native Library



String Encryption


Native Library: Native to Bytecode

4

```
.method public static a()[B  
  
    invoke-virtual {v0}, Lk/v/F;->fpu()[B  
  
    move-result-object v0  
  
    return-object v0  
.end method
```

flexispy malware

Native Library



String Encryption

Ground truth

■ Labelled dataset

- APKs from **malpedia** with String Encryption
- number of deobfuscated strings of each sample
- location of the deobfuscation routine


```
  {
    "family" : "apk.anubis",
    "alt_names" : "apk.bankbot",
    "state" : "finished",
    "analyzed" : true,
    "string encryption" : [
      {
        "is" : true,
        "type" : [
          "PS.encrypted string (2)",
          "PS.encrypted string (2)",
          "PS.encrypted string (4)"
        ],
        "deobfuscations" : [
          "2dfde3d394b7eaf3a45693dc95f9c5540c9fd2b3bc7e89e9ebc9d12963c00bee bankbot_sample1.apk (426)",
          "aeaccdc3fb0ddb674770ff87007b4454b0a8d706ebd57ee7e75599ca7bda19d8 bankbot_sample2.apk (454)",
          "16cb502391b003ec9c8a4fc604f7939d8f9224eecb6d0f8a801f72069508943e bankbot_sample3.apk (98)"
        ],
        "deobfuscation routine" : [
          "bankbot_sample1|Lturs/rickertsit/a;->a(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;",
          "bankbot_sample1|Lturs/rickertsit/b;->a(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;",
          "bankbot_sample2|Lcom/google/android/gms/common/zzc$zza;->zzcm(Ljava/lang/String;)B",
          "bankbot_sample2|Lcom/google/android/gms/internal/zzal;->zzb([BLjava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;",
          "bankbot_sample3|Lorg/support/q;->M(Ljava.lang.Object;)Ljava.lang.String;",
          "bankbot_sample3|Lcom/google/android/gms/common/zzh;->zzgf(Ljava.lang.String)B[",
          "bankbot_sample3|Lcom/wierdhammer/expenses/s;->d(Ljava.lang.Object;)Ljava.lang.String",
          "bankbot_sample3|Lcom/wierdhammer/expenses/h;->d(Ljava.lang.Object;)Ljava.lang.String"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
```

<https://github.com/fkie-cad/destroid>

String Encryption

Ground truth

malpedia Android families




Details in paper

String Encryption


Ground truth

malpedia Android families



- String Encryption (50)
- No String Encryption (46)

Distribution of String Encryption types




- String Repository - <clinit>
- Pass String - Encrypted String
- Pass String - Static Method
- Others

Details in paper


DeStroid

High-Level Workflow




DeStroid

Static Analysis: DeStroid-Heuristic



DeStroid

Static Analysis: DeStroid-Heuristic




```
public class MortgagesApplication extends Application {
    private static final String a = Transfusion.a[20];
    private static final String b = Transfusion.a[5];
    private static final String c = Transfusion.a[8];
    private static final String d = Transfusion.a[25];
    private static Boolean e = Boolean.valueOf(false);
    private ClassLoader f;
    private File g;
    private File h;

    private String a(int i) {
        String name = getClass().getName();
        int lastIndexOf = name.lastIndexOf(i, name.length());
        return lastIndexOf == -1 ? name : name.substring(0, lastIndexOf) + Transfusion.a[24];
    }

    private static Field a(Object obj, String str) {
        Object obj2 = obj.getClass();
        while (obj2 != null) {
            try {
                Field field = (Field) obj2.getDeclaredMethod(Transfusion.a[13], new Class[]{String.class}).invoke(obj2, new Object[]{str});
                if (((Boolean) field.getClass().getMethod(Transfusion.a[28], new Class[]{Boolean.TYPE}).invoke(field, new Object[]{true})).booleanValue()) {
                    return field;
                }
                field.getClass().getMethod(Transfusion.a[12], new Class[]{Boolean.TYPE}).invoke(field, new Object[]{Boolean.valueOf(true)});
                return field;
            } catch (Exception e) {
                Class obj22 = obj2.getSuperclass();
            }
        }
        return null;
    }
}
```


DeStroid

Static Analysis: DeStroid-Heuristic




DeStroid

Static Analysis: DeStroid-Heuristic




DeStroid

Static Analysis: DeStroid-Heuristic




DeStroid

Dynamic analysis: Dynamic Deobfuscation




DeStroid

Dynamic analysis: Dynamic Deobfuscation




DeStroid

Dynamic Deobfuscation



DeStroid

Patching



```
public class MortgagesApplication extends Application {
    private static final String a = "MortgagesApplication";
    private static final String b = "dex2";
    private static final String c = "reallocates.db3";
    private static final String d = "test.apk";
    private static Boolean e = Boolean.valueOf(false);
    private ClassLoader f;
    private File g;
    private File h;

    private String a(int i) {
        String name = getClass().getName();
        int lastIndexOf = name.lastIndexOf(i, name.length());
        return lastIndexOf == -1 ? name : name.substring(0, lastIndexOf) + ".UnrecognisablyActivity";
    }

    private static Field a(Object obj, String str) {
        Object obj2 = obj.getClass();
        while (obj2 != null) {
            try {
                Field field = (Field) obj2.getDeclaredMethod("getDeclaredField", new Class[]{String.class}).invoke(obj2, new Object[]{str});
                if (((Boolean) field.getClass().getMethod("isAccessible", new Class[0]).invoke(field, new Object[0])).booleanValue()) {
                    return field;
                }
                field.getClass().getMethod("setAccessible", new Class[]{Boolean.TYPE}).invoke(field, new Object[]{Boolean.valueOf(true)});
                return field;
            } catch (Exception e) {
                Class obj22 = obj2.getSuperclass();
            }
        }
        return null;
    }
}
```

Evaluation

Setup

- ground truth used as dataset for evaluation



Evaluation

Setup

- ground truth used as dataset for evaluation




- investigate performance of different string encryption deobfuscation approaches
 - deobfuscator
 - JMD
 - Dex-Oracle
 - simplify
 - DeStroid
- deobfuscation details (in paper)



Evaluation

Results



Details in paper

Summary

- A taxonomy of String Encryption implementations
 - usage in current Android malware
 - identification of their major String Encryption types
- A labelled dataset of Android malware samples
 - number of expected deobfuscated strings
 - location of the deobfuscation part
- DeStroid
 - our solution on automatically deobfuscate decrypted Strings
 - works best for String Repository and Pass String
 - online at <https://github.com/fkie-cad/destroid>

Thanks for your attention!

<https://github.com/fkie-cad/destroid>