

Nice, Côte d'Azur, France, 23rd (Workshops) and 24th to 26th (Main conference) April 2024

The Botnet & Malware Ecosystems Fighting Conference

DESKTOP-Group — The Saga continues

BOTCONF 2024 - LIGHTNING TALK

C:> whoami /all

- Tom Ueltschi
- Swiss Post CERT / SOC / CSIRT since 2007 (soon 17 years!)
- Focus & Interests: Malware Analysis, Threat Intel, Threat Hunting, Red / Purple Teaming
- Member of many trust groups & infosec communities
- FIRST SIG member (malware analysis, red teaming, CTI)
- Twitter: @c_APT_ure | @SwissPost_CERT

Swiss Post CERT

@SwissPost_CERT

CERT-Team @swisspost / @postschweiz Cyber Defence for post.ch / AS12511 FIRST member @FIRSTdotOrg

BotConf speaker history

- 2013 My Name is Hunter, Ponmocup Hunter
- 2014 Ponmocup Hunter 2.0 The Sequel
- 2015 LT: Creating your own CTI (in 3 minutes.. or 5 ©)
- 2016 Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon (and Splunk)
- 2017 LT: Sysmon FTW! ©
- 2018 Hunting and detecting APTs using Sysmon and PowerShell logging
- 2019 DESKTOP-Group Tracking a Persistent Threat Group (using Email Headers)
- 2022 LT: Advanced Persistent Speaker ☺ (DESKTOP-Group)
- 2023 LT: DESKTOP-Group or OPERA1ER
- 2024 CFP rejected ⊕ → Lightning talk again ⊕

Who is "DESKTOP-Group"?

This is just a preliminary post about my research of a threat actor (TA) or group (TG) that we have named "DESKTOP-Group". Other companies (Orange-CERT, Group-IB, SWIFT) have other names for this TA, but they are not yet publicly known or linked yet. (I will update this post, as soon as more becomes public)

We started tracking this TA's activity in early 2018, while analyzing the first malware laden attack mails during February 2018. For the next three years, we saw and analyzed 170 distinct attack mails (campaigns) from this TA, but during 2021 it became harder to link malware mails back to them with high confidence.

The first public presentation "DESKTOP-Group – Tracking a Persistent Threat Group (using Email Headers)" was at BotConf 2019. Slides (PDF) are available from my Github repo.

In 2020, I also presented about this TA at ReversingLabs #Reversing2020 online conference. A video (starts around 14:30m) and PDF slides are also available.

In 2019, I started sharing on Twitter about this TA, later starting to use the hashtag #DESKTOPgroup.

- 2018 started tracking DESKTOP-Group @ SwissPost (over 5 years ago!)
- 2019 first talk @ BotConf
- 2020 second talk @ Reversing2020 (online)
- 2021 Group-IB & Orange-CERT wrote Threat Report (yet unpublished)
- 2022 SWIFT adds «DESKTOP-Group» alias to a TA they track & publish
- Nov 2022 Group-IB published OPERA1ER Threat Report («Playing God without permission»)
- 2023 Key figure of DESKTOP-Group arrested in INTERPOL «Operation Nervone»



5 July 2023

Home > News and Events > News > 2023 > Suspected key figure of notorious cybercrime group arrested in joint operation

Operation Nervone has dealt a significant blow to the OPERA1ER group.

ABIDJAN, Côte d'Ivoire – Over the last four years, a highly-organized criminal organization has targeted financial institutions and mobile banking services with malware, phishing campaigns and large-scale Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams.

Known as OPERA1ER, with aliases such as NX\$M\$, DESKTOP Group and Common Raven, the group is believed to have stolen an estimated USD 11 million - potentially as much as 30 million - in more than 30 attacks across 15 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

A detailed overview of <u>OPERA1ER's methods</u> was published by Group-IB and Orange S.A. in November 2022. Following extensive cooperation, INTERPOL, AFRIPOL, Group-IB and Côte d'Ivoire's Direction de l'Information et des Traces Technologiques (DITT) are announcing the arrest of a suspected senior member of the group, dealing a significant blow to their criminal activities.

How it happened

The group's illicit e-mail campaigns were first detected by Group-IB in 2018, when they recognized spear phishing operations responsible for spreading malware such as remote access tools.

Under the auspices of Operation Nervone, INTERPOL's Cybercrime Directorate, Group-IB, and third-party stakeholder Orange exchanged intelligence which helped track the group's behaviours and identify a probable location for their activities.

Additional information was provided by the United States Secret Service's Criminal Investigative Division and Booz Allen Hamilton DarkLabs cybersecurity researchers, confirming a number of leads.

In early June, authorities in Côte d'Ivoire were able to arrest a key suspect linked to attacks against financial institutions across Africa.

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According to the INTERPOL's 2022 African Cyberthreat Assessment Report, cybercrime is a growing threat in the West Africa region, with victims located worldwide. Operation NERVONE underscores INTERPOL's commitment to proactively combat the threat of cybercrime in the region.

Operation Nervone was backed by two key INTERPOL initiatives: the African Joint Operation against Cybercrime and the INTERPOL Support Programme for the African Union in relation to AFRIPOL, funded by the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Germany's Federal Foreign Office, respectively. The following is just some short analysis, why I assess that DESKTOP-group is again and still active after the arrest of a key figure from their group via INTERPOL Operation Nervone.

So far, at least the following 3 DDNS domains have been re-used in attacks that were previously used by DESKTOP-group since 2020.

```
2020-10-01 23
                bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            79[.]134.225.95
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2020-10-10 137
               bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
                                            185[.]174.40.142
2020-10-29 123
                bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            153[.]92.126.202
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2020-12-02 27
                bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            80[.]85.159.33
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2021-10-19 67
               bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            185[.]118.167.229
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2021-11-18 49
                bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            185[.]118.167.229
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2022-07-30 717 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            80[.]85.153.132
                                                                Remcos RAT
2022-08-15 133 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            80[.]85.153.132
                                                                Remcos RAT
2022-11-16 106 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            197[.]210.54.233
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2022-11-24 61
                nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            91[.]192.100.57
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2022-11-29 21
                nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            64[.]188.23.167
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2023-04-14 20
               nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            45[.]88.67.63
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2023-05-02 9
                nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            45[.]88.67.63
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2023-05-04 8
                donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                            212[.]193.30.230
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2023-05-14 611 nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            212[.]193.30.230
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
2023-05-16 40
                nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            212[.]193.30.230
                                                                AveMaria / WarZone RAT
```

- *.ddns.net domains (VT: 1st seen)
- bestsuccess (2020-09-10)
- nightmare** (2022-11-21)
- donelpacino (2023-04-03)

AveMaria / WarZone RAT Remcos RAT

** 2023-06-?? INTERPOL Operation Nervone arrest in early June **

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```
2020-10-01_23 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net 79[.]134
2020-10-10_137 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net 185[.]17
2020-10-29_123 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net 153[.]92
2020-12-02_27 bestsuccess.ddns[.]net 80[.]85.
```

bestsuccess 2023-10-08

nightmare** 2023-08-29

donelpacino 2023-10-20

```
2023-05-02_9 nightmare4666.ddns[.]net 45[.]88.

2023-05-04_8 donelpacino.ddns[.]net 212[.]19

2023-05-14_611 nightmare4666.ddns[.]net 212[.]19


2023-05-16_40 nightmare4666.ddns[.]net 212[.]19
```

** 2023-06-?? INTER

NOT
THE END

LuminosityLink RAT
STRRAT (Java)
AsyncRAT

```
** 2023-06-?? INTERPOL Operation Nervone arrest in early June **
2023-07-26 14 donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                            79[.]110.49.161
                                                               Luminosity Link RAT
    261b9cccbf347d864e683502e8679a4a Order 23040.jar
                                                               Luminosity Link RAT
2023-07-26 26 donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                            79[.]110.49.161
    fcf09ec5a1f5629f31b7f74bddb5777a july order 23040.jar
2023-08-08 14 donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                           2[.]59.254.111
                                                                STRRAT
    30bb7390115b12a186b7669772988121 NETBANCO TRANSFER 3307281 EUR .jar
    mx1 116459271.eml
2023-08-29 2
                bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                           197[.]210.84.253
                                                                STRRAT
2023-08-29-2
                hestsuccess ddns[ lnet
                                            80[.]85.153.248
                                                                STRRAT
2023-08-29 2
                nightmare4666.ddns[.]net
                                            80[.]85.153.248
                                                                STRRAT
    Idcoul48pzyaoacue4oaciu3uop3p3db BvNGEN61523 dt.24-7-23.jar
    mx1 118281019.eml
2023-09-17 21
              donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                           2[.]59.254.111
                                                               AsyncRAT
    a4b2e852228b19f3db8c4bb7a40c3e5f Notification of transfer made - Santander142023.rar
    460c5e2904724e5babe7c3f7eaaf8de9 Notification of transfer made - Santander142023.exe
    mx1 120007793.eml
2023-10-08 31
               bestsuccess.ddns[.]net
                                            95[.]214.27.6
                                                               AsyncRAT
                                     rw-23-003 TIEM2 Stainless Steel Tank (WWTP.tar
    34f632802a37841968d962af8fbb570b PW-23-003 TIEM2 Stainless Steel Tank (WWTP.exe
    mx1 122331231.eml
2023-10-20 608 donelpacino.ddns[.]net
                                            95[.]214.27.6
                                                               AsvncRAT
    81DQC3Q/18ICIA51C5I90D065A1Z1Q/3 DKAWINGS SPECS PRODUCTIONOCT19.tar.qz
    0a6b309ba8626654ad7c3a86eb12dd81
                                     DRAWINGS SPECS PRODUCTIONOCT19.tar
    7f1d46d49965b7730f2eaccce9137992 DRAWINGS SPECS PRODUCTIONOCT19.exe
    mx1 123323013.eml
2023-10-31 25 AgentTesla "https://dis-
cord.com/api/webhooks/1150692736119361588/Rwbv7P9AYcq9eoTRXZ59ctAZJYpuoJGk2ChE0KxT-
blNwa8HnnpS9UeliszrhNNN3Hpmp"
    1641104425ae2ee456edf0c3a17e9972 Notificacao de transferencia.zip
    bc6233fbc2fd08acef75d9f90cb54efc Notificacao de transferencia.exe
    mx1 124304837.eml
```



UUID: d779bc29-0c4b-4a0f-8886-b486e7c6d668



I guess it's official now. Will be presenting my (still ongoing research) about "DESKTOP-group" at @Botconf

Thu 12/5 @ 9am seems like a tough spot **3** botconf.eu/botconf-2019/s...

Still looking for collaboration on research groups.google.com/d/forum/deskto...
If interested please apply
#BotConf

		Thursday osth December 2019
08:30	09.00	Welcome and registration
09:00	09:30	"DESKTOP-Group" – Tracking a Persistent Threat Group (using Email Headers) Tom Ueitschi
		At BotCord 2015, I presented a lightning talk "Creating your own CTI in 3 minutes". This presentation is building on that capability to do semi- automated malware analysis based on a commercial sandbox solution. I will discuss a malware campaign analysis from a persistent threat actor (or group) over the past is months and still ongoing. The attacks are linked by email headers, targeting, and malware CSC
		infrastructure

5:54 PM · Oct 1, 2019

Thanks for accepting my LT!!

- Twitter: @c_APT_ure
- Blog: http://c-apt-ure.blogspot.com/