Behavior-Driven Development in Malware Analysis

Thomas Barabosch, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla firstname.lastname@fkie.fraunhofer.de Botconf 2015, Paris, France









2

Motivation

- Malware analysis continues to be a tedious and time consuming task (some might call it *job security…*)
- Extraction of malicious behavior is a daily task
 - Analyze (obfuscated) binary code
 - Reimplement in higher language like Python or C (*Reimplementation task*)
- Code is just "translated" from assembly to higher language
 - Functionality is not ensured
 - Readability is poor
 - No documentation
 - Underlying semantics not clear

Solution: Improve current process



Related Work

Extraction of malicious behavior

[Caballero2010], [Kolbitsch2010], [Barabosch2012]

Using TDD in RE processes

[VanLindberg2008], [DeSousa2010]

<u>However</u>, current state-of-the-art solutions

- are not publicly available
- can not cope with anti-analysis techniques
- can not cope with complex obfuscations
- assume source code and documentation available



Requirements of Solution

- 1. Allows the analyst to <u>describe concisely and naturally</u> what he observes
- 2. Ensures that the <u>code works continuously</u> during the implementation
- 3. Resulting code should be <u>concise</u>, <u>documented and</u> <u>readable</u>
- 4. <u>Increases the focus</u> of the analyst

Proposed Solution:

Apply Behavior-Driven Development to Malware Analysis



*-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT




In the Beginning there was Software Testing...

- Tests whether a software does what it is supposed to do
- Shows quality of a software to stake-holders
- Finds defects and failures in a software
- Problems
 - Infrequent testing (e.g. Waterfall model)
 - Code coverage
 - Not efficient if done manually



Test Driven Development (TDD)

- Short development cycle
- Ideally ensures 100% coverage
- Small and comprehensive code base due to frequent refactoring
- Tests serve as a documentation of the code



The mantra of Test-Driven Development (TDD) is "red, green, refactor."

Source: http://luizricardo.org/wordpress/wp-content/upload-files/2014/05/tdd_flow.gif



Behavior Driven Development (BDD)

- BDD focuses on a clear understanding of the software's behavior rather than modules, functions, etc.
- BDD emerged from TDD
- Test cases are formulated in natural language
- Strong theoretical foundation (Hoare logic)
 - {P} C {Q} -> Given _ When _ Then _



Behavior Driven Development (BDD)

Scenario: Coffee maker can add sugar to coffee

Given customer chooses sugar

When customer presses OK button

Then coffee maker adds sugar to coffee


10

BDD IN MALWARE ANALYSIS



Overview of the Process

- Preparation phase
- Implementation phase (Observe Test Code Refactor)





Preparation - Pinpointing the Behavior

- First pinpoint the behavior in the binary
 - Find entry point **S** and exits {**E**₁, ..., **E**_n}
 - Extract initial test data for acceptance test
 - State acceptance test



Source: https://trak-1.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/haystack.jpg



Pinpointing the Behavior (DGA)


Domain Generation Algorithm


- See Daniel's talk (DGArchive A deep dive into domain generating malware)
- Several types of DGAs [Barabosch2012]
 - Deterministic/non-deterministic
 - Time-dependent/independent
- Naïve approach (forwards): look for timing sources
 - E.g. GetSystemTime, NtQuerySystemTime, GetLocalTime
- Naïve approach (backwards): DNS resolution
 - E.g. gethostbyname



Pinpointing the Behavior (command dispatcher)

- Bots implement several commands
- Bots receive and process messages of botmaster
 - Command dispatcher
- Naïve approach: follow data flow from network source
 - Monitor networking APIs like receive
 - Follow data flow in forwards direction until switch statement








Preparation - Initial End-To-End Acceptance Test

- Serves as guide throughout the implementation phase
- Tests behavior as a black box
- Capture data at S and {E₁, ..., E_n}
- Once this test passes -> reimplementation successfully



Step 1: Observing the Behavior




- Top-Down-Approach
 - Getting a rough overview
 - Identifying individual features and their interfaces
- Gather test data at interfaces (input/output)
 - Use this data for mocking later
 - Mock interfaces of submodules at first



Step 2: Writing a Test

Given-Then-When

- Fundamental: mock objects
 - Mimic the behavior of real objects
 - In software development, they replace, e.g., non-existing objects
 - In our case, they replace modules that are not 100% understood
 - Gather test data at module interfaces







Step 2: Writing a Test

Given-Then-When

- Fundamental: mock objects
 - Mimic the behavior of real objects
 - In software development, they replace, e.g., non-existing objects
 - In our case, they replace modules that are not 100% understood
 - Gather test data at module interfaces









Step 2: Writing a Test

Given-Then-When


- Fundamental: mock objects
 - Mimic the behavior of real objects
 - In software development, they replace, e.g., non-existing objects
 - In our case, they replace modules that are not 100% understood
 - Gather test data at module interfaces








Step 3: Making the Test Pass



- Just write enough code to make the test pass
- Binary serves as valid system specification
- Focus and just implement code to make the test pass
- Premature optimization is the root of all evil



Step 4: Refactoring the Code



- Altering the syntax without altering the semantics
- Ensures conciseness and readability
- Many refactorings do exist (see also [Fowler1999])
 - Refactoring inlined code (*memcpy*)
 - Break up complex expressions
 - Removing dead expressions
- Does the end-to-end acceptance test pass?



Limitations

- Decrease in time efficiency
 - Extra time pays off due to benefits
 - TDD comes with an overhead of 15% to 35% [Bhat2006]
- TDD/BDD comes from "normal" software development
 - Reusability not needed in malware analysis
 - Long-running projects do exist also in the field of malware analysis



CASE STUDY NYMAIM DGA



Nymaim

- Nymaim is a malware dropper
 - But also credential stealer, SOCKS, etc.
- Heavily obfuscated
 - Decompilers fail to work
 - See IDApatchwork presentation of Daniel Plohmann



optval	= byte ptr -4	
nuch	aba	
push	ebp	
MOV	ebp, esp	
push	ecx	
push	ebx	
push	edi	
MOV	edi, eax	
mov	eax, esi	
call	sub_1001E837	
MOV imul	[esi+18h], edi	
imul	edi, 3E8h	
push	4	; optlen
lea	eax, [ebp+optval]	t optual
push	eax	; optval
push	1005h	; optname
MOV	ebx, OFFFFh	. lowel
push	ebx	; level
push	dword ptr [esi]	; 5
MOV	dword ptr [ebp+optval], edi	
mov call	edi, ds:setsockopt	
test	edi ; setsockopt eax, eax	
jz	short loc_1001E1DA	
12	50010 100_10010100	
loc 10	01E1C8:	; CODE XREF: sub_1001E18E+5E_j
mov	dword ptr [esi+10h], 3	
call	ds:WSAGetLastError	
mov	[esi+14h], eax	
jmp	short loc_1001E1EE	
;		
	01E1DA:	; CODE XREF: sub_1001E18E+38†j
push	4	; optlen
lea	eax, [ebp+optval]	
push	eax	; optval
push	1006h	; optname
push	ebx	; level
push	dword ptr [esi]	; 5
call	edi ; setsockopt	
test	eax, eax	
jnz	short loc_1001E1C8	

- Unpacked Dridex
- Regular functions
- No strange constants
- Resolved imports
- Reasonable control flow



sub_4617872 proc near

arg_0= dword ptr 8
arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch

; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:000034D6 SI ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:0000BFF1 SI ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:00014729 SI

push	ebp							
mov	ebp, esp							
push	eax							
	ecx							
	1oc_46034D6							
sub_461	7B72 endp							
;	• • • • • • • • • •							
lea	esi, [ebp-1Ch]							
push	63h ; 'c'							
call	sub_460A4C2							
pusn	CDV							
push	66E7E05Bh							
	66E82D2Ch							
	sub_460CACB							
mov	ecx, [esi]							
add	ecx, [esi+4]							
MOV	eax, 99ADDFB1h							
call	sub_461AB04							
add	eax, ecx							
MOV	[ebp-2Ch], eax							
mov	eax, 9FA6BD27h							
call	sub_461AB04							
add	eax, ecx							
mov	[ebp-28h], eax							
mov	eax, 9F3EAD68h							
call	sub_4603580							
.	d xmm2, xmm3							
pop	ecx							
			_		-			_
; =====	===== S U B	R	U	U		Ι	Ν	F

Unpacked Nymaim

Irregular functions

Function entries

Function ends



sub_4617872 proc near

arg_0= dword ptr 8 arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch

; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:000034D6 SI ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:0000BFF1 SI ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seg000:00014729 SI

	push	ebp
	mov	ebp, esp
	push	eax
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ecx
		1oc 46034D6
		/B72_endp
	_	
	;	
	lea	esi, [ebp-1Ch]
	push	63h ; 'c'
	call	sub_460A4C2
1	pusn	CDA
	push	66E7E05Bh
	push	66E82D2Ch
l	call	SUD 460CACB
	mov	ecx, [esi]
	add	ecx, [esi+4]
	mov	eax, 99ADDFB1h
	call	sub_461AB04
	add	eax, ecx
	mov	[ebp-2Ch], eax
	mov	eax, 9FA6BD27h
	call	sub_461AB04
	add	eax, ecx
1	MOV	[eop-zøn], eax
1	mov	eax, 9F3EAD68h
	push	0A62CBC97h

cvtps2pd xmm2, xmm3 pop ecx

LZ 00000

Unpacked Nymaim

Irregular functions

Function entries

Function ends

Strange constants



sub_4617872 proc near

arg 0= dword ptr 8 arg 4= dword ptr OCh ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:000034D6 SI2 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:0000BFF1 SIZ ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:00014729 SIZ push ebp MOV ebp, esp push eax push ecx 1oc 46034D6 imp. sub_4617872 endp esi, [ebp-1Ch] lea 63h ; 'c' push sub 460A4C2 call pusn CDA push 66E7E05Bh 66E82D2Ch push call sub 460CACB ecx. [esi] moγ ecx, [esi+4] add eax, 99ADDFB1h mov call sub_461AB04 add eax, ecx [ebp-2Ch], eax MOV eax, 9FA6BD27h mov call sub_461AB04 add eax, ecx MOV eop-zent, eax MOV eax, 9F3EAD68h push 0A62CBC97h call sub 4603580 cutos2nd ymm2 ymm3 ecx pop

Unpacked Nymaim

Irregular functions

Function entries

Function ends

Strange constants

Control flow computed dynamically



; ========= SUBROUTINE =

sub_4617872 proc near

arq 0= dword ptr 8 arg 4= dword ptr OCh ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:000034D6 SI2 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:0000BFF1 SIZ ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT seq000:00014729 SIZ push ebp MOV ebp, esp **Dush** eax push ecx imp – 1oc 46034D6 sub 4617872 endp esi, [ebp-1Ch] lea 63h ; 'c' push sub 460A4C2 call push ebx push 66E7E05Bh 66E82D2Ch push call sub 460CACB ecx, [esi] MOV ecx, [esi+4] add eax, 99ADDFB1h mov | call sub_461AB04 add eax, ecx [ebp-2Ch], eax mov eax, 9FA6BD27h MOV call sub_461AB04 add eax, ecx [ebp-28h], eax MOV MOV eax, 9F3EAD68h push 0A62CBC97h -ub 6400E00 cvtps2pd xmm2, xmm3 DOD ecx

Unpacked Nymaim

Irregular functions

Function entries

Function ends

- Strange constants
- Control flow computed dynamically

Confuses disassembler



; ======= S U B R O U T I N E

Nymaim's DGA – Tools of Trade and Resources

Tools of trade

Immunity Debugger 1.85

IDA Pro 6.8

Mandiant ApateDNS 1.0

Python 2.7.9

Behave 1.2.5 [Behave2015]

Source code on *Bitbucket*!

https://bitbucket.org/tbarabosch/botconf-2015-bdd-in-mw-analysis



Nymaim's DGA – First Observations

- Black-boxing shows that
 - At first four hard-coded domain are resolved and contacted

Time	Domain Requested	
06:17:03	google.com	
06:17:03	timetengstell.com	
06:17:04	timetengstell.com	
06:17:05	timetengstell.com	
06:17:06	timetenastell.com	
06:17:07	tfnpoxe xyz	
06:17:07 06:17:08	tfnpoxe.xyz fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08	fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08 06:17:09	fexfmywazxk.net pdudehfb.net	



Nymaim's DGA – First Observations

- Black-boxing shows that
 - At first four hard-coded domain are resolved and contacted
 - In case of failure domains are generated and resolved
 - Deterministic: same results in two different VMs
 - Time-dependent: different results when date changed

Time	Domain Requested	
06:17:03	google.com	
06:17:03	timetengstell.com	
06:17:04	timetengstell.com	
06:17:05	timetengstell.com	
06:17:06	timetenastell.com	
00 17 07		
06:17:07	tfnpoxe.xyz	
06:17:07 06:17:08	tfnpoxe.xyz fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08	fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08 06:17:09	fexfmywazxk.net pdudehfb.net	



Nymaim's DGA – First Observations

- Black-boxing shows that
 - At first four hard-coded domain are resolved and contacted
 - In case of failure domains are generated and resolved
 - Deterministic: same results in two different VMs
 - Time-dependent: different results when date changed
- Pinpointing the algorithm
 - Breaking on GetSystemTime -> Bingo!
 - Input: time
 - Output: 30 domain names

Time	Domain Requested	
06:17:03	google.com	
06:17:03	timetengstell.com	
06:17:04	timetengstell.com	
06:17:05	timetengstell.com	
06:17:06	timetenastell.com	
06:17:07	tfnpoxe xyz	
06:17:07 06:17:08	tfnpoxe.xyz fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08	fexfmywazxk.net	
06:17:08 06:17:09	fexfmywazxk.net pdudehfb.net	



Nymaim's DGA – Our First Test: Acceptance Test

We know already many important parameters
 Interfaces of algorithm

Also we have gathered a first set of test data

- Time information and list of generated domains
- We write our first end-to-end acceptance test
 - It does not pass
 - However, once it passes we are done!



Nymaim's DGA – Our First Test: Acceptance Test

Scenario: Nymaim DGA computes domains of 2015-06-12
Given the day is "2015-06-12"
When DGA computes domains for this date
Then the domais for this date are
| domains |
| dmjdfotcy.in |
| yjcmub.info |
| uiismpexr.info |
| rszsgpzivi.info |




Nymaim's DGA – Our First Test: Acceptance Test

```
Scenario: Nymaim DGA computes domains of 2015-06-12
Given the day is "2015-06-12"
When DGA computes domains for this date
Then the domais for this date are
| domains
| dmjdfotcy.in |
| yjcmub.info |
| uiismpexr.info |
| rszsgpzivi.info |
```

```
Failing scenarios:
   features/dga.feature:5 Nymaim DGA computes domains of 2015-06-12
0 features passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped
0 scenarios passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped
2 steps passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped, 0 undefined
Took 0m0.002s
```



Nymaim's DGA – Our First Test: Acceptance Test





Nymaim's DGA – Overview

- While stepping over the code we have noticed that there
 - Initialization
 - Main logic
 - PRNG (Xorshift)
- We focus on one component at a time
 - Reverse the main logic, mock the rest!



push dword ptr [ebp-30h] push 6 push edx push 9169F53Dh 6E9591F2h push call sub 4601335 lea ecx, [eax+6] lea ebx, [esi+4] loc 46162A8: call sub_46031ED dword ptr [ebp-30h] push 5Dh ; '] push call obfuscateRegisterPush push edx 984951E2h push push 67B63528h call sub_46029EF mov [ebx], al call sub_4613862 add [ebx], al inc ebx dec ecx short loc_46162A8 jnz sub 460D912 call mov [ebx], al inc ebx push dword ptr [ebp-30h] push Ó push esi push 56D194D2h push 56D20DF2h call sub_4614592 inc eax dec eax iz tld ru dec eax jz tld_net dec eax jz tld in dec eax jz tld com dec eax jz tld xyz deobfuscateString call mov [ebx], eax mov dword ptr [ebx+4], 0 add ebx, 5 loc_4616326: lea eax, [esi+4] sub ebx, esi mov [esi+2], bx add esi, ebx dec dword ptr [ebp-8] inz 100 4616288



dword ptr [ebp-30h] push push 6 push edx 9169F53Dh push push 6E9591F2h call sub 4601335 lea ecx, [eax+6] lea ebx, [esi+4] 1oc 46162A8: call sub 46031ED dword ptr [ebp-30h] push push 5Dh ;] obfuscateRegisterPush call push edx. 984951E2h push 67B63528h push call sub 46029EF mov [ebx], al call sub 4613862 add [ebx], al inc ebx dec ecx jnz short loc 46162A8 sub 4600912 call mov [ebx], al inc ebx dword ptr [ebp-30h] push push 6 push esi push 56D194D2h push 56D20DF2h call sub 4614592 inc eax dec eax iz tld ru dec eax iz tld net dec eax iz tld in dec eax iz tld com dec eax jz tld xyz call deobfuscateString mov [ebx], eax mov dword ptr [ebx+4], 0 add ebx, 5 loc 4616326: lea eax, [esi+4] sub ebx, esi mov [esi+2], bx add esi, ebx dword ptr [ebp-8] dec 100 4616288 inz

```
def generateDomains(self):
    domains = []
    for i in range(0, DOMAIN_COUNT):
        domain = self.generateDomain()
        domains.append(domain)
    return domains
```

```
def generateDomain(self):
    lenDomain = self.computeLengthOfDomain()
    domain = ""
    for j in range(lenDomain):
        domain += self.computeChar()
    domain += "."
    tld = self.computeTld()
    domain += tld
    return domain
```



dword ptr [ebp-30h] push push 6 push edx 9169F53Dh push push 6E9591F2h sub 4601335 call ecx, [eax+6] lea lea ebx, [esi+4] 1oc 46162A8: call sub_46031ED dword ptr [ebp-30h] push push 5Dh ;] obfuscateRegisterPush call push edx. 984951E2h push 67B63528h push call sub 46029EF mov [ebx], al call sub 4613862 add [ebx], al inc ebx dec ecx jnz short loc 46162A8 sub 4600912 call mov [ebx], al inc ebx push dword ptr [ebp-30h] push 6 push esi push 56D194D2h push 56D20DF2h call sub 4614592 inc eax dec eax iz tld ru dec eax iz tld net dec eax iz tld in dec eax iz tld com dec eax jz tld xyz call deobfuscateString mov [ebx], eax mov dword ptr [ebx+4], 0 add ebx, 5 loc 4616326: lea eax, [esi+4] sub ebx, esi mov [esi+2], bx add esi, ebx dword ptr [ebp-8] dec 100 4616288 inz

```
def generateDomains(self):
    domains = []
    for i in range(0, DOMAIN_COUNT):
        domain = self.generateDomain()
        domains.append(domain)
    return domains
def generateDomain(self):
    lenDomain = self.computeLengthOfDomain()
    domain = ""
    for j in range(lenDomain):
        domain += self.computeChar()
    domain += ""
```

tld = self.computeTld()

return domain



- Test only the main logic, e.g. choose TLD
- Mock the rest!
- Might require several scenarios



- Test only the main logic, e.g. choose TLD
- Mock the rest!
- Might require several scenarios

```
Scenario: Nymaim DGA chooses correct TLD from set of
possible TLDs ["ru","net","in","com","xyz", "info"]
Given the seeds
seed
78670654
44370352
35461477
97912344
When DGA computes TLD
Then the TLD is ru
```



- Next, we have a look at the PRNG (Xorshift)
- Still we do not want to deal with the seeds
- Input: five integers (4* seed + modulo)
- Output: integer [0, modulo 1]
- Has side effects on the seeds !



Scenario: PRNG works correctly for given seeds and modulo Given the modulo 600 And the seeds seed 123172080 79962903 133504895 2326822159 When PRNG executes Then the output is 1



ecx, ecx xor eax, [ebp+arg_0] MOV eax, eax or i setz cl. eax, ecx or: esi, [ebp+arg 4] MOV eax, 64h imul eax, eax or. 10c 46118AE jz edi, eax mov eax, [esi] MOV eax, OBh shl eax, [esi] xor edx, [esi+4] mov [esi], edx add ecx, [esi+8] MOV [esi+4], ecx add ebx, [esi+0Ch] mov [esi+8], ebx add ebx, 13h shr ebx, [esi+0Ch] xor ebx, eax xor eax, 8 shr ebx, eax xor [esi+OCh], ebx MOV eax, ebx mov add eax, ecx edx, edx xor div edi eax, edx xchq edx, edx xor edi, 64h ; 'd' MOV div edi



xor ecx, ecx eax, [ebp+arg 0] MOV eax, eax or setz cl. or i eax, ecx esi, [ebp+arq 4] MOV eax, 64h imul eax, eax or. jz. 10c 46118AE edi, eax MOV eax, [esi] MOV shl eax, OBh eax, [esi] xor edx, [esi+4] mov [esi], edx add ecx, [esi+8] MOV add [esi+4], ecx ebx, [esi+0Ch] mov [esi+8], ebx add ebx, 13h shr ebx, [esi+0Ch] xor ebx, eax xor shr eax, 8 xor ebx, eax [esi+OCh], ebx MOV eax, ebx MOV add eax, ecx xor edx, edx div edi eax, edx xchq edx, edx xor edi, 64h ; 'd' MOV div edi 🛛

```
def execute(self, seeds, modulo):
```


```
a = cutTo32bits(seeds.seeds[0] << 11) ^ seeds.seeds[0]
b = cutTo32bits(seeds.seeds[3] >> 19) ^ seeds.seeds[3]
a = b ^ a ^ cutTo32bits(a >> 8)
c = seeds.seeds[2]
self._updateSeeds(seeds, a)
return (cutTo32bits(a + c) % modulo) / 100
def _updateSeeds(self, s, a):
    s.seeds[0] = cutTo32bits(s.seeds[0] + s.seeds[1])
    s.seeds[1] = cutTo32bits(s.seeds[0] + s.seeds[2])
    s.seeds[2] = cutTo32bits(s.seeds[2] + s.seeds[2])
    s.seeds[3] = a
```




Nymaim's DGA – Results

1 feature passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped 5 scenarios passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped 16 steps passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped, 0 undefined Took 0m0.004s










One end-to-end acceptance test





- Five tests of DGA's features
- One end-to-end acceptance test
- Readable code
 - One class implementing the main logic
 - One class implementing the PRNG (strategy pattern)
 - One class serving as data structure



CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK



Conclusion & Future Work

- BDD in malware analysis
- Case Study Nymaim
 - Check source code on Bitbucket!
 - https://bitbucket.org/tbarabosch/botconf-2015-bdd-in-mw-analysis
- Future work
 - Automatic test case generation
 - Tools for gathering test data in RE context



