TAKEDOWN CLIENT-SERVER BOTNETS THE ISP-WAY

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About me

- Living in Hanoi, Vietnam
- Do research in:
 - Reverse engineering
 - Malware analysis
 - Botnet tracking and sinkhole
- \Box Love:
 - Travelling
 - Football
- Currently working at Viettel
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Content

- Why ISP care about botnet takedown?
- Botnet infrastructure
- How botnet usually being taken down?
- ISP advantages
- Taking down a botnet
- Some examples
- □ Conclusion

Why ISP care about botnet takedown?

- Customer protection
- Network protection
- Law enforcement requests








Botnet infrastructure

Client-Server botnet



- Centralized commandand-control server(s)
- Command-and-control servers using domain(s) and/or IP(s)
- Commands directly from command-andcontrol servers

How botnet usually being taken down?

Client-server botnet

- Identify command-and-control servers: IP(s), domain(s)
- Working with service providers to obtain the servers:
 - Re-buy expired domains
 - Request for domain/hosting termination or domain re-buy

Disadvantages

- Depend on service providers
- Nothing to do with bullet-proof domains/hostings

ISP advantages

- Network control and monitor
 - Domain name server (DNS) system
 - Traffic monitoring/processing/routing
 - Deep packet inspection (DPI) framework

Methodology Analysis **;;; C&C** Server Server Control Zombie **7**ombie Zombie

- Redirect C&C traffic to ISP's analysis server
 - Analysis server works totally the same as the real C&C server
 - Send termination command to connected victim
 - Inform customer if needed

- Target selection
 - Collect information about any botnet found
 - Identify their C&C domain(s)/IP(s)
 - Statistic:
 - Which botnet is running in ISP network?
 - Which botnet has the largest number of customer infected?
 - Which botnet should be care first?
 - Search for some recently samples of chosen botnet

Reverse engineering

- Deep reversing
 - Not just to identify C&C domain(s)/IP(s)
 - But to fully build bot protocol
- Traffic analysis
 - Capture traffic from/to the real C&C servers
 - Ensure the protocol correctly match the captured traffic


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□ Sinkhole server Plugins Zeus Andromeda Ramnit Zeus Dispatcher Andromeda Web-user . . . Database Web-user

- Identify botnet by content
- Serve each botnet by its own protocol
- Multiple botnet supported
- User notification
 supported


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Command-and-control redirection



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
Command-and-control redirection



ysis DNS Sinkhole

- Routing DNS traffic to ISP DNS
- ISP DNS "point" C&C domains to analysis server
- Serve other benign traffic as usual

Command-and-control redirection



- IP routing
 - Routing C&C IPs to analysis server
 - Analysis server uses iptables to NAT and serve bot requests

Control and terminate botnet

- Serve and save bot information to database
- Send termination command(s) to bot
- Notify users if needed

- Ramnit botnet
 - File virus
 - Protocol
 - Raw TCP (port 447, 443...)
 - Custom RC4 encrypted
 - Commands
 - Update
 - Download and execute
 - Take screenshot
 - Remote data access
 - 📕 Kill OS 🙂

Ramnit botnet sinkhole

Status	05	Network Speed	Group	Public IP	Created Date	Last Active
Online	Windows 7 Service Pack 1 (6.1.7601)	4032 KB/s	allsup	Mark Control	2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:23:20
Online	Windows 7 (6.1.7600)	496 KB/s	allsup		2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:22:30
Online	Windows 7 Service Pack 1 (6.1.7601)	2302 KB/s	allsup	Environment (Second Second (Second Second Second (Second Second (Second Second (Second Second (Second Second (Second Second (Second Second (Second Second Second (Second Second Sec	2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:24:16
Online	Windows 7 Service Pack 1 (6.1.7601)	547 KB/s	allsup		2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:23:19
Online	Windows 7 (6.1.7600)	1765 KB/s	allsup	• Provide Las	2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:23:20
Online	Windows XP Service Pack 3 (5.1.2600)	1596 KB/s	allsup	- 11 C	2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:20:51
Online	Windows XP Service Pack 3 (5.1.2600)	2677 KB/s	allsup		2016-07-05 14:34:40	2016-07-13 16:20:51
Online	Windows 7 (6.1.7600)	7781 KB/s	allsup	N (1997)	2016-07-05 14:34:41	2016-07-13 16:24:15

- Andromeda botnet
 - Protocol
 - HTTP
 - Custom RC4 encrypted
 - Commands
 - Update
 - Download and execute (EXE, DLL)
 - Uninstall self

Andromeda botnet sinkhole

Status	05	Public IP	Created Date	Last Active
Online	Windows 7		2016-07-11 15:09:01	2016-07-13 16:30:30
Online	Windows XP	······································	2016-07-11 15:09:01	2016-07-13 16:30:30
Online	Windows 7		2016-07-11 15:09:10	2016-07-13 16:30:30
Online	Windows XP	 Contract sets 	2016-07-11 15:09:10	2016-07-13 16:30:09
Online	Windows XP		2016-07-11 15:09:13	2016-07-13 16:30:29
Online	Windows XP		2016-07-11 15:09:13	2016-07-13 16:29:33
Online	Windows XP	 A second second 	2016-07-11 15:09:13	2016-07-13 16:30:15
Online	Windows XP		2016-07-11 15:09:13	2016-07-13 16:29:43
Online	Windows 7		2016-07-11 15:09:13	2016-07-13 16:30:26

Conclusion

Pros

- Easy and quick to deploy
- Work with most client-server botnet
- Fit for any ISP
- Easy to co-operate between ISPs, countries


Cons

 Not work on anti-takeover botnet (bots verify server before executing commands)



Botnet infrastructure

Peer-to-Peer botnet



- Peer-to-peer network
- Two types of peer: Master and Slave
- Commands received from master peers
- Bot owner controls
 - some master peers

How botnet usually being taken down?

- Peer-to-peer botnet
 - Join peer-to-peer botnet network
 - Identify owner's master peers
 - Pretend to be a master peer
 - Send commands to isolate owner's peers from network
 - Send commands to remove botnet itself